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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that cover issues in poverty
analysis. The rst essay (Partial Identication of Poverty Measures with Contam-
inated and Corrupted Data) applies a partial identication approach to poverty
measurement when data errors are non-classical in the sense that it is not assumed
that the error is statistically independent of the outcome of interest, and the er-
ror distribution has a mass point at zero. This paper shows that it is possible to
nd non-parametric bounds for the class of additively separable poverty measures.
A methodology to draw statistical inference on partially identied parameters is
extended and applied to the setting of poverty measurement. The methodology
developed in this essay is applied to the estimation of poverty treatment eects of
an anti-poverty program in the presence of contaminated data.
The second essay (On the Design of an Optimal Transfer Schedule with Time
Inconsistent Preferences) addresses a very recent literature that studies public
policy and its connection to behavioral economics. It incorporates the phenomenon
of time inconsistency into the problem of designing an optimal transfer schedule.
It is shown that if program beneciaries are time inconsistent and receive all of the
resources in just one payment, then the equilibrium allocation is always inecient.
In the spirit of the second welfare theorem, I also show that any ecient allocation
can be obtained in equilibrium when the policymaker has full information. Thisassumption is relaxed by introducing uncertainty and asymmetric information into
the model. The optimal solution reects the dilemma that a policymaker has
to face when playing the roles of commitment enforcer and insurance provider
simultaneously.
The third essay (Does Conditionality Generate Heterogeneity and Regressivity
in Program Impacts? The Progresa Experience) studies both empirically and
theoretically the consequences of introducing a conditional cash transfer scheme
for the distribution of program impacts. Intuitively, if the conditioned-on good
is normal, then better-o households tend to receive a larger positive impact. I
formalize this insight by means of a simple model of child labor, applying the Nash-
Bargaining approach as the solution concept. A series of tests for heterogeneity in
program impacts are developed and applied to Progresa, an anti-poverty program
in Mexico. It can be concluded that this program exhibits a lot of heterogeneity in
treatment eects. Consistent with the model, and under the assumption of rank
preservation, program impacts are distributionally regressive, although positive,
within the treated population.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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1.1 Introduction
Much of the statistical analysis of poverty measurement regards the data em-
ployed to estimate a poverty measure as error-free. However, it is amply recognized
that measurement error is a very common phenomenon for most data sets used
in the estimation of poverty. This problem is particularly relevant for develop-
ing countries, where the majority of the poor are concentrated, since nancial,
technological, and logistical constraints are more likely to aect the quality of the
data.
Measurement error can aect the estimation of poverty in dierent ways. For
example, the poverty line may be set for heterogenous groups of people without
considering idiosyncratic dierences in the cost of basic needs, arbitrary imputa-
tions may be made when missing and zero outcomes appear in the sample, and the
variable of interest may be misreported by an important subset of survey respon-
dents. Often the methodologies applied to solve these problems are arbitrary; at
the same time, the results are highly sensitive to such adjustments. For instance,
Szekely, Lustig, Cumpa and Mejia (2000) applied several techniques to adjust for
misreporting in Latin America. In the case of Mexico they found that, depending
on the method for performing the adjustment, either 14 percent or 76.6 percent of
the population is below the poverty line (in absolute terms it implies a dierence
of 57 million individuals). This has important policy implications since, depending
on which of these numbers is used as a reference, the amount of resources directed
to social programs can be considered either appropriate or totally insucient.
Several approaches have been developed in order to analyze the eects of mea-
surement error on poverty measurement. For instance, Chesher and Schluter (2002)
study multiplicative measurement error distributed continuously and indepen-3
dently of true income to investigate the sensitivity of welfare measures to alterna-
tive amounts of measurement error. Ravallion (1994) considers additive random
errors when estimating individual-specic poverty lines, nding that heterogeneity
in error distributions generates ambiguous poverty rankings. An alternative ap-
proach, robust estimation, aims at developing point estimators that are not highly
sensitive to errors in the data.1 The objective is to guard against worse-case sce-
narios that errors in the data could conceivably produce. In that sense it takes an
ex-ante perspective of the problem. Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996) apply this
approach to poverty measurement by using the concept of the inuence function
to assess the inuence of an innitesimal amount of contamination upon the value
of a poverty statistic (Hampel 1974). They nd that poverty measures that take
as their primitive concept poverty gaps rather incomes of the poor are in general
robust under this criterion.
In the present study, we do not consider classical measurement error, that is to
say, we do not assume the existence of chronic errors aecting every observation,
neither do we assume that the outcome of interest is statistically independent of
the error. Instead of assuming that the error distributions have no mass point at
zero, we consider the impact of intermittent errors by setting an upper bound to
the proportion of gross errors within the data. Since a poverty measure is not point
identied under the assumptions of the model of errors under consideration, we
follow Horowitz and Manski (1995) and apply a partial identication approach.2
By using a fully non-parametric method, we show that for the family of additively
1See Hampel et al (1986) and Huber (1981) for a comprehensive treatment of
robust inference.
2Examples of applications of this approach in other settings are Molinari (2005a)
and Dominitz and Sherman (2005). See Manski (2003) for an overview of this
literature4
separable poverty measures it is possible to nd identication regions under very
mild assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some important con-
cepts for poverty measurement. Section 3 states the problem formally, present-
ing both the contaminated and corrupted sampling models within the context of
poverty measurement. Section 4 investigates the identication region for additively
separable poverty measures (ASP). It is shown that we can nd upper and lower
bounds for this class of poverty measures with both contaminated and corrupted
data. Section 5 characterizes the identication regions of ASP measures through
their length and breakdown points. Section 6 applies two conceptually dierent
types of condence intervals for partially identied poverty measures. The impli-
cations for hypothesis testing when a poverty measure is not point identied are
also discussed. Section 7 provides some insight on the eect of both data contam-
ination and data corruption for poverty comparisons. Sections 8 and 9 give two
empirical illustrations of the methodology developed in the paper. Most of the
mathematical details are in the Appendix.
1.2 Poverty Measurement: Conceptual Framework
Let A denote the  algebra of Lebesgue measurable sets on R. Let P denote
the set of all probability distributions on (R;A). Thus for any P 2 P the triple
(R;A;P) is a probability space. Let z 2 R++ be the poverty line.
A person is said to be in poverty if her income, y 2 R, or any other measure of
her economic status is strictly below z. An aggregate poverty index is dened as
a functional of the distribution P 2 P. Formally:
Denition 1.1 A Poverty Index is a functional (P;z) : P  R++ ! R that5
indicates the degree of poverty when a particular variable has distribution P and
the poverty line is z.
An important type of poverty measures is the Additively Separable Poverty(ASP)
class which is dened as follows:
(P;z) =
Z
(y;z)dP (1.1)
where (y;z) : R  R++ ! R is the poverty evaluation function, an indicator of
the severity of poverty for a person with income y when the poverty line is xed
at z.
Since the axiomatic approach to poverty measurement proposed by Sen (1976),
most economists interested in the phenomenon of poverty have quantied poverty
in a manner consistent with those principles. One of those principles, the focus
axiom, requires a poverty measure to be independent of the income distribution of
the non poor. The monotonicity axiom says that, everything else equal, a reduction
in the income of a poor individual must increase the poverty measure; the transfer
axiom emphasizes the positive eect of a regressive transfer on the poverty measure,
that is to say, given other things, a pure transfer of income from a poor individual
to any other individual that is richer must increase the poverty measure. Finally,
Kakwani (1980) has proposed a 4th property that prioritizes transfers taking place
down in the distribution, other things being equal. These distributional concerns
are made operational through the characteristics of the poverty evaluation function
(y;z). It is usually assumed that (y;z) is continuous for y < z, non increasing
in its rst argument and non decreasing in its second argument. It is also assumed
that (y;z) is convex in its rst argument and (y;z) = 0 for y  z.6
1.2.1 Specic Poverty Measures
Watts (1968) proposed a poverty measure which is dened as follows:
W =
Z
1(y < z)ln(
y
z
)dP (1.2)
This poverty measure satises Sen's monotonicity and transfer axioms as well
as Kakwani's transfer-sensitivity axiom.
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) proposed an  class of poverty measures,
, which can be obtained by:
 =
Z
1(y < z)(1  
y
z
)
dP (1.3)
 satises monotonicity axiom for  > 0, transfer axiom for  > 1, and transfer
sensitivity axiom for  > 2.
Hagenaars (1987) provided a poverty measure that satises all three axioms.
The specic poverty measure he gave is
H =
Z
1(y < z)(1  
lny
lnz
)dP (1.4)
Finally, we consider the Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981) poverty measure:
 =
1

Z
1(y < z)(1   (
y
z
)
)dP (1.5)
which satises the monotonicity axiom for all  > 0, and both transfer axioms
for  < 1. Finally, Chakravarty (1983) derived a poverty measure which is equal
to Ch = . This measure also satises all three axioms for  2 (0;1).
1.3 Statement of the Problem
Let each member j of population J be characterized by the tuple (y
j
1;y
j
0) in
the space R  R, where y
j
1 is the outcome of interest denoting the "true" equiva-
lent income (or expenditure) for a given poverty line z. Let the random variable7
(y1;y0) : J  ! R  R have distribution P(y1;y0). Let a random sample be drawn
from P(y1;y0). Let's assume that instead of observing y1, one observes a random
variable y dened by:
y  wy1 + (1   w)y0 (1.6)
Realizations of y with w = 0 are said to be data errors, those with w = 1
are error-free, and y itself is a contaminated version of y1. Let Q(y) denote the
distribution of the observable y. Let Pi = Pi(yi) denote the marginal distribution
of yi. Let Pij = Pij(yi j w = j) denote the distribution of y conditional on the
event w = j for i;j 2 f0;1g. Let p = P(w = 0) be the marginal probability of a
data error. With data errors, the sampling process does not identify P1 (the object
of interest) but only Q(y), the distribution of the observable y. By the law of total
probability, these two distributions can be decomposed as follows:
P1 = (1   p)P11 + pP10 (1.7)
Q(y) = (1   p)P11 + pP00 (1.8)
This problem can be approached from dierent perspectives. In robust estima-
tion P1 is held xed and Q(y) is allowed to range over all distributions consistent
with both equations. In the context of poverty measurement, the objective would
be to estimate the maximum possible distance between (Q;z) and (P1;z). In
contrast, the present analysis holds Q(y) xed because it is identied by the data,
and P1 is allowed to range over all distributions consistent with (3) and (4). This
approach recognizes that the parameter of interest might not be point identied,
but it can often be bounded.
The sampling process reveals only the distribution Q(y). However, informative
identication regions emerge if knowledge of the empirical distribution is combined8
with a non-trivial upper bound, , on p.
This investigations analyzes two dierent cases of data errors. In the rst case,
we will assume that the occurrence of data errors is independent of the sample
realizations from the population of interest. Formally
P1 = P11 (1.9)
This particular model of data errors is known as "contaminated data" or "con-
taminated sampling" model (Huber 1981). In the other case, (9) does not hold and
it is only assumed that there exists a non-trivial upper bound on the error proba-
bility. Horowitz and Manski (1995) refer to this case as "corrupted sampling".
Dene the sets
P1(p)  P \ f(1   p)11 + p10 : (11;10) 2 P11(p)  Pg (1.10)
P11(p)  P \

Q   p00
1   p
: 00 2 P

(1.11)
If there exists a non-trivial upper bound, , on the probability of data errors,
then it can be proved that P11 and P1 belong to the sets P11() and P1() respec-
tively, where P11()  P1(). These restrictions are sharp in the sense that they
exhaust all the available information, given the maintained assumptions (Horowitz
and Manski 1995).
1.4 Partial Identication of Poverty Measures
Suppose that a proportion p < 1 of the data is erroneous. Furthermore, assume
there exists a non-trivial upper bound, , on p: p   < 1.3 From the analysis
3In practice, upper bounds on the probability of data errors can be estimated
from a validation data set or by the proportion of imputed data in the sample. See
Kreider and Pepper (2004) for an application of a validation model.9
above, we know that the distribution of interest P1 is not identied: i.e. P1() is
not a singleton.
Even though P1 is not point identied, it is partially identied in the sense
that it belongs to the identication region P1(). There is a mapping from this set
into the domain in R of a given poverty measure . Therefore, the question arises
whether there is a way to characterize the identication region of . As we will see
below, it is possible to do so for the class of ASP poverty measures by ordering the
distributions in P according to a stochastic dominance criterion. Such criterion
is dened as follows:
Denition 1.2 Let F;G 2 P. Distribution F First Order Stochastically domi-
nates (FOD) distribution G if
F(( 1;x])  G(( 1;x])
for all x 2 R.
In the case of monotone functions, there is a well-known result that will be
helpful to obtain identication regions for the ASP measures:
Lemma 1.1 The Distribution F rst-order stochastically dominates the distribu-
tion G if and only if, for every non decreasing function ' : R ! R, we have
Z
'(x)dF(x) 
Z
'(x)dG(x) (1.12)
Finally, let me introduce a basic concept that is a building block for identica-
tion regions.
Denition 1.3 For  2 (0;1], the -quantile of Q(y) is given by
r() = infft : Q(( 1;t])  g.10
Now we can state the main result of this section. Following the approach of
Horowitz and Manski (1995) to nd sharp bounds on parameters that respect
stochastic dominance 4 we can construct identication regions for ASP measures.
Proposition 1.1 Let it be known that p   < 1. Dene probability distributions
L and U on R as follows:
L =
8
> <
> :
Q(yt)
1  for t < r(1   )
1 otherwise
U =
8
> <
> :
0 for t < r()
Q(yt) 
1  otherwise
If (P;z) belongs to the family of Additively Separable Poverty Measures and the
poverty evaluation function is non-increasing in y, then identication regions for
(P11;z) and (P1;z) are given by:
H[(P11;z)] = [l(U;z);u(L;z)] (1.13)
and
H[(P1;z)] = [(1   )l(U;z) +  0;(1   )u(L;z) +  1] (1.14)
where  0 = infy2R+ (y;z) and  1 = supy2R+ (y;z).
PROOF: See Appendix.
These results are quite intuitive. In the case of contaminated data, the smallest
feasible value of (P11;z) occurs when we place all of the erroneous data as far
out as possible in the left-hand tail of the observed distribution Q. Similarly, to
4A parameter () respects stochastic dominance if (F)  (G) whenever F
FOD G.11
obtain the largest feasible value of (P11;z), L places all of the erroneous data
as far out as possible in the right-hand tail of the observed income distribution. If
the data is corrupted, we follow a similar procedure, placing all of the erroneous
data at infy (y;z) and supy (y;z) instead.
Example 1.1 Assume P1 = P11. Let Q(y) = U[0;1], 0 < p <  < z < 1   . Let
the poverty measure be given by ' =
R 1
0 1(y < z)d. Then, '(P1;z) 2 [z 
1 ; z
1 ].
If P1 6= P11 then '(P1;z) 2 [z   ;z + ]. Notice that '(Q;z) belongs to both
intervals.
1.5 Characterizing Identication Regions
The objective of this section is to describe the properties of the identication
region for ASP measures. Our approach is not normative in that we are not arguing
that one poverty measure is better than another based on our ndings. We analyze
identication regions through two concepts: identication breakdown points and
length of the identication region, with the hope of shedding some light on the
identication properties of poverty measures.
1.5.1 Identication Breakdown Points for Poverty Mea-
sures
We denote by D the family of ASP measures indexed by j with poverty evalu-
ation function j(y;z) satisfying j(y;z) = 0 for all y  z, increasing in its second
argument, decreasing in its rst argument, and continuous and convex for all y < z.
Moreover, we assume the existence of a constant cj 2 R+ such that j(0;z) = cj.
We denote by Rj = fj(P;z);P 2 Pg the range of a poverty measure j(P;z) in12
D. More precisely, the range of a poverty measure in D is given by Rj = [0;cj].5
From the literature on robust estimation we borrow the concept of breakdown
point which in the present setting can be interpreted as the largest fraction of
erroneous data that can be in a sample without driving a poverty measure to either
boundary of its range. However, as noticed by Horowitz and Manski (1995), there
are some conceptual dierences between the breakdown point in robust estimation
and its counterpart in identication analysis. While in the partial identication
approach  is evaluated at the empirical distribution Q, in robust estimation it
is evaluated at the distribution of interest P1. More formally, the identication
breakdown point of a poverty measure (P;z) when data are contaminated can be
constructed as follows: for some ASP measure in D dene
(j) = j(L;z)   cj (1.15)
 (j) = j(U;z) (1.16)
and let 

j = supf : j() < 0g, and 
 
j = supf :  j() > 0g. The identication
breakdown point for an ASP measure is given by:


j = minf

j;
 
j g (1.17)
Let HQ =
R
1(y < z)dQ be the head-count ratio or proportion of the poor for the
observed distribution Q, and let H be its breakdown point. Clearly the head-count
ratio is an element of D. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2 For all Q 2 P, we have

H = inff

j : j 2 Dg
5Most of the ASP measures used in empirical work belong to this class. For
example, the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), and the Clark, Hemming and
Ulph (1981) families of poverty measures are two elements of D.13
PROOF: See Appendix.
Therefore, the breakdown point for the head-count ratio is a lower-bound of
the set D.
1.5.2 Length
Another way to "compare" the dierent poverty measures is through the length
of their identication regions. Although we are not arguing here that one can
choose one poverty measure over another based on this criterion, the results ob-
tained in this section provide some initial insights about the behavior of the dif-
ferent poverty measures for the model of errors under consideration. To formalize
the analysis, let m : B ! R+ be the Lebesgue measure on the Borel sets, B, of R+.
Here is the main result of this section:
Proposition 1.3 Let 1(P;z) : P  R++ ! R and 2(P;z) : P  R++ ! R be
two additively separable poverty measures with non-increasing evaluation functions
1(y;z) : R++  R ! R and 2(y;z) : R++  R ! R, respectively. Suppose
that 2(y;z)  1(y;z) for all y < z and 2(y;z) = 1(y;z), otherwise. Let
z  maxfr();r(1   )g If the data is either corrupted or contaminated, then
m(H[2])  m(H[1])
PROOF: See Appendix.
We can get a similar result by imposing more assumptions on the "shape" of the
poverty evaluation function. In particular, we can use the fact that some families of
poverty measures are generated by "convexifying" a poverty evaluation function in
order to show the existence of length orderings within families of poverty measures.
The following two corollaries state this result more formally:14
Corollary 1.1 Let 1(y;z) : R+  R++ ! R be a non increasing, and continuous
on (0;z) poverty evaluation function, with z  maxfr();r(1   )g, and f be a
convex function on 1(y;z) such that
A1. 2(y;z) = f  1(y;z)
A2. f(1(0;z))  1(0;z)
A3. f(1(z;z)) = 1(z;z)
Then m(H[2])  m(H[1]).
PROOF: See Appendix.
Corollary 1.2 Given two continuous poverty evaluation functions 1(y;z) : R+
R++ ! R and 1(y;z) : R+  R++ ! R, z  maxfr();r(1   )g such that
A4. 1(0;z) = 2(0;z)
A5. 1(y;z) = 2(y;z), for all y  z
A6. 0
i < 0, 00
i > 0 on (0;z), i = 1;2
A7.  
1(y;z)00
1(y;z)0   
2(y;z)00
2(y;z)0 uniformly on (0;z)
Then m(H[2])  m(H[1]).
PROOF: See Appendix.
Example 1.2 An -ordering.
Let (y;z) : R+  R++ ! R be dened as follows:
 =
8
> <
> :
(1  
y
z) if y 2 [0;z)
0 if y > z
Dene fc(x) = xc. Clearly this is a convex function for all x > 0 and c  1.
Take any positive integers 1 and 2 such that 1 = k2 > 0. Hence,
1(y;z) = fk  215
By Corollary 1.1, m2  m1.
Example 1.3 An e-ordering
Let Ch(y;z) : R+  R++ ! R be dened as follows:
Ch =
8
> <
> :
1   (
y
z)e if y 2 [0;z)
0 if y > z
for e 2 (0;1). After some algebraic manipulations we have:
 
00
Ch
0
Ch =
(1 e)
y
on (0;z). Therefore, me(H[Ch]) is decreasing on e by Corollary 1.2.
Example 1.4 Length rankings.
Let   1,  2 (0;1), e 2 (0;1). Then it is easy to show, applying Proposition
1.3, that the following length rankings hold: m(H[W])  m(H[C])  m(H[])
and m(H[W])  m(H[C])  m(H[Ch]).
1.6 Statistical Inference for Partially Identied Poverty
Measures
In this section, we obtain two conceptually dierent types of condence sets
for the identication regions of poverty measures. The rst type of condence set
uses the Bonferroni's inequality to develop condence intervals that asymptotically
cover the entire identication region with at least probability . For the second
type of condence set, we follow Imbens and Manski (2004) by applying condence
intervals that asymptotically cover the true value of the poverty measure with at
least this probability. We also discuss some implications of this methodology for
hypothesis testing in the context of partially identied poverty measures.16
1.6.1 Condence Intervals
Let (R;A;Q) be a probability space, and let P be a space of probability dis-
tributions. The distribution Q is not known, but a random sample y1;y2;:::;yn is
available.
In the point identied case ( = 0), a consistent estimator of the class of ASP
measures is given by
^  =
1
n
n X
i=1
(yi;z) (1.18)
where (y;z) is a measurable poverty evaluation function. By applying The Cen-
tral Limit Theorem, the standard 100 % condence interval for (P;z) is given
by:
CI

 =

^    z +1
2
^ 
p
n
; ^  + z +1
2
^ 
p
n

(1.19)
where ^  =  +op(1) and z is the  quantile of the standard normal distribution.6
To derive the asymptotic properties for the Bonferroni condence set, we will
make use of a result on L-statistics due to Stigler (1973), who explores the asymp-
totic behavior of trimmed means. Dene the condence interval CI
[l;u]
 as
CI
[l;u]
 =

^ l   z +1
2
^ l p
n
; ^ u + z +1
2
^ u p
n

(1.20)
Where ^ l, ^ u, ^ 2
l , and ^ 2
u are estimators satisfying, respectively
A8. ^ l = l + op(1)
A9. ^ u = l + op(1)
A10. ^ 2
l =
V arU((y;z))+((r(1 )) l)
1  + op(1)
A11. ^ 2
u =
V arL((y;z))+((r()) u)
1  + op(1)
We have the following result
6Kakwani (1993) describes this methodology for ASP measures.17
Proposition 1.4 Let  < 1 be known. Assume
R
(y;z)2dQ < 1. Let r(1   )
and r() be continuity points of Q(y). Let the poverty evaluation function, (y;z),
be a non-increasing function that is continuous at r(1   ) and r(). Then
lim
n!1
P([l;u]  CI
[l;u]
 )   (1.21)
PROOF: See Appendix.
For the second type of condence interval, dene  = U L and ^  = ^ U ^ L
and consider the following set of regularity conditions, which are equivalent to the
assumptions imposed by Imbens and Manski (2004).7
A13. Q(y) 2 F, where F is the set of distribution functions for which
R
j
(y;z) j3 dQ < 1, Q00 is bounded in the neighborhoods of r() and r(1 ) while
Q0(r()) > 0 and Q0(r(1   )) > 0.
A14. 2  2
l ;2
u  2 for some positive and nite 2 and 2.
A15. u   l   < 1
A16. For all  > 0 there are  > 0, K and n0 such that n  n0 implies
Pr
p
n j ^     j> K

< , uniformly in Q 2 F.
Dene the condence interval CI

 as:
CI

 =

b l  
Cn^ l p
n
; b u +
Cn^ u p
n

(1.22)
where Cn satises

 
Cn +
p
n
^ 
max(^ l; ^ u)
!
  
 
 Cn

=  (1.23)
7More precisely, we have made use of the results on uniform convergence of
trimmed means developed by De Wett (1976) to develop a set of regularity con-
ditions equivalent to those required by Imbens and Manski (2004) to obtain their
asymptotic result.18
Proposition 1.5 Let  < 1. Let r(1   ) and r() be continuity points of Q(y).
Let the poverty evaluation function, (y;z), be a non-increasing function that is
continuous at r(1   ) and r(). Suppose A13-A16 hold. Then
limn!1infP2PP

 2 CI



  (1.24)
PROOF: See Appendix.
1.6.2 Hypothesis Testing
Consider the implications of testing hypothesis of the form:
H0 :  = 0
versus
H1 :  6= 0
When a parameter is not point identied, the power of a test is not a straight-
forward extension of the point identied case. For instance, consider the test
reject H0 if
p
n(^ l 0)
l > z +1
2 or
p
n(^ u 0)
u <  z +1
2
The rejection region is
R = f(y1;:::;yn) :
p
n(^ l 0)
l < z +1
2 or
p
n(^ u 0)
u <  z +1
2 g
and the power function is dened by
n() = P((y1;:::;yn) 2 R)
Dene the events
An = fYn +
p
n(l 0)
^ l > z +1
2 g19
Bn = fZn +
p
n(u 0)
^ u <  z +1
2 g
where Yn =
p
n(^ l l)
^ l and Zn =
p
n(^ u u)
^ u . From proposition 1.4, we can deduce
that this test has a level 1    since
lim
n!1
n(0) = lim
n!1
P(An [ Bn)
 1   lim
n!1
P([l;u]  CI
[l;u]
 )
 1   
Next, suppose the true value of  is  6= 0. If  is point identied, the proba-
bility of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis, H0, tends to 1 asymptotically. On
the other hand, if the parameter is not point identied, the power of the test for
values other than 0 is not longer equal to one in general. To verify that this is
the case, it will be helpful to divide the analysis in several cases:
i) 0 2 [l;u]
In this case limn!1 n() = limn!1 n(0)  1   . Hence, a type II error
is more likely to arise whenever 0 belongs to the identication region.
ii) 0 < l
Notice that
lim
n!1
n(
)  lim
n!1
P(An [ Bn)
 lim
n!1
P(
p
n(^ l   l)
^ l
+
p
n(l   0)
^ l
)
= 1
where I have used the fact that
p
n(^ l l)
^ l +
p
n(l 0)
^ l will converge to +1 in prob-
ability. Since () is a probability measure, we have limn!1 n() = 1.20
iii) 0 > u
By a similar argument to the one applied in ii), we have limn!1 n() = 1.
Interestingly, the power () is a decreasing function of  because the size
of the identication region is positively related to it: the larger the value of the
upper bound , the more likely it is that 0 belongs to the identication region,
implying a higher a probability that a type II error will occur.
1.7 Poverty Comparisons
This section addresses both identication and inference problems when compar-
ing some poverty measure between two populations and data errors are generated
by the models under consideration. The problem is formulated as follows: there are
two populations, A and B, characterized by distributions F and G, respectively.
Moreover, we assume the existence of upper bounds A and B on the proportion
of data errors. We are interested in comparing, in terms of some ASP measure,
the two populations.
Dene the dierence between the poverty measures corresponding to distribu-
tion F and G as D = (F;z)   (G;z). Proposition 1.1 can be used to obtain
informative, although not necessarily sharp, outer bounds on D given A and B.89
Proposition 1.6 Let it be known that pA  A < 1 and pB  B < 1. If (P;z)
8In principle, it is not necessary to restrict both distributions to have same type
of data errors. For instance, distribution A could be characterized by contaminated
data while distribution B by corrupted data. The analysis and conclusions would
not change by including that level of detail.
9As noticed by Manski (2003), outerbounds on dierences between parameters
that respect stochastic dominance are generally non-sharp. In the present case, for
these to be sharp, there would have to exist two distributions of errors that jointly
make (F;z) and (G;z) attain their sharp bounds.21
belongs to the family of additively separable poverty measures and the poverty eval-
uation function is non-increasing in y, then identication regions for D(F11;G11;z)
and D(F1;G1;z) are given by
H[D(F11;G11;z)] = [
l
A(F;z)   
u
B(G;z);
u
A(F;z)   
l
B(G;z)] (1.25)
and
H[D(F1;G1;z)] = [D
l
1;D
u
1] (1.26)
where
Du
1 = (1   A)u
A(F;z)   (1   B)l
B(G;z) + A 1   B 0
Dl
1 = (1   A)l
A(F;z)   (1   B)u
B(G;z) + A 0   B 1
1.7.1 Statistical Inference
Let y1;:::;yn and y1;:::;ym be two independent random samples drawn from
F and G, respectively. We will construct condence intervals for the identication
region of the poverty dierence A   B.
Dene the condence interval CIDl;Du
 as follows
CI
[Dl;Du]
 =
h
^ l(F)   ^ u(G)   z +1
2 ^ 
; ^ u(F)   ^ l(G) + z +1
2 ^ 

i
(1.27)
where
^ 
 =
r
^ 2
lF
n
+
^ 2
uG
m
^ 
 =
r
^ 2
uF
n
+
^ 2
lG
m
Proposition 1.7 Let i < 1, i = A;B be known,. Assume Ei((y;z)2) < 1. Let
ri(1   i) and ri(i) be continuity points and let m;n ! 1 such that m
m+n !  222
(0;1). Let the poverty evaluation function, (y;z), be continuous at ri(1 i) and
ri(i). Then
lim
n;m!1
P([Dl;Du]  CI
[Dl;Du]
 )   (1.28)
PROOF: See Appendix.
1.8 Application: Evaluation of an Anti-Poverty Program
with Missing Treatments
1.8.1 Progresa
In 1997, the Mexican government introduced the Programa de Educacion, Salud
y Alimentacion (the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program), better known as
Progresa, and recently renamed Oportunidades, as an important element of its
more general strategy to eradicate poverty in Mexico. The program is character-
ized by a multiplicity of objectives such as improving the educational, health and
nutritional status of poor families.
Progresa provides cash transfers, in-kind health benets and nutritional su-
plements to beneciary families. Moreover, the delivery of the cash transfers is
exclusively through the mothers, and is linked to children's enrollment and school
attendance. This conditionality works as follows: in localities where Progresa op-
erates, those households classied as poor with children enrolled in grades 3 to
9, are eligible to receive the grant every two months. The average bi-monthly
payment to a beneciary family amounts to 20 percent of the value of bi-monthly
consumption expenditures prior to the beginning of the program. Moreover, these
grants are estimated taking into account the opportunity cost of sending children
to school, given the characteristics of the labor market, household production, and23
gender dierences. By the end of 2002, nearly 4.24 million families (around 20
percent of all Mexican households) were incorporated into the program. These
households constitute around 77 percent of those households considered to be in
extreme poverty.
Because of logistical and nancial constraints, the program was introduced in
several phases. The sequentiality of the program was capitalized by randomly
selecting 506 localities in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla,
Queretaro, San Luis Potosi and Veracruz. Of the 506 localities, 320 localities were
assigned to the treatment group and the rest were assigned to the control group. In
total 24,077 households were selected to participate in the evaluation sample. The
rst evaluation survey took place in March 1998, 2 months before the distribution
of benets started. 3 rounds of surveys took place afterwards: October/November
1998, June 1999 and November 1999. The localities that served as control group
started receiving benets by December 2000. However, as noticed by Buddelmeyer
and Skouas (2004), in the treatment localities 27% of the eligible population had
not received any benets by March 2000 due to some administrative error.
1.8.2 Poverty Treatment Eects
Let us introduce some basic notation that will be helpful for the rest of the
section. There are two potential states of the world, (y1;y0), for each individual,
where y1 and y0 are the outcomes that an individual would obtain if she were
and she were not, respectively, a beneciary of PROGRESA. Lets denote observed
outcome by y and program participation by the indicator variable d, where d = 1
if the individual participates in the program, and d = 0 otherwise. The policy-
maker observes (y;d), but he cannot observe both states (y1;y0). Formally, the24
policymaker observes the random variable y = dy1 + (1   d)y0.
We are interested in the poverty treatment eect (PTE) on the treated. This
eect is given by:
 = (F(y1 j d = 1);z)   (F(y0 j d = 1);z)
Where F(y1 j d = 1) is the distribution of the outcome of interest for the treated
group, and F(y0 j d = 1) is its counterfactual. Randomization guarantees the
identication of PTE since we have F(y0 j d = 1) = F(y0 j d = 0).
As it was mentioned above, in the case of PROGRESA we have a problem of
measurement error for the treatment group since a proportion of the households
selected as beneciaries had not received the cash transfer by the year 2000. Ap-
plying the model of section 3 to the current setting, let each individual in the
treatment group be characterized by the tuple (y11;y10), where y11 and y10 are the
outcomes that an individual randomized in the treatment group would obtain if
she were and she were not, respectively, participating in PROGRESA. Instead of
observing y11, one observes a contaminated variable y1 dened by
y1  wy11 + (1   w)y10 (1.29)
From section 3 we know that F(y11) = F(y1 j d = 1) cannot be point identied if
E(w) < 1. However, it can be partially identied if we possess some information
on the marginal probability of data errors p = P(w = 0), in particular if there
exists a non trivial upper bound on this probability.
If one assume that w is independent of y11, which is equivalent to say that data
from the treatment group is contaminated, then we can apply the results obtained
in section 4 to nd the identication region for the PTE:
H[] = [
l
(F(y11);z)   (F(y0 j d = 1);z);
u
(F(y11);z)   (F(y0 j d = 1);z)]25
where  < 1 is as an upperbound on the probability of not receiving treatment
when the unit of analysis has been randomized in the treatment group.
Under the assumptions of proposition 7, the following condence interval,
CI
[l;u]
 , asymptotically covers the PTE with at least probability :

^ l(F11)   ^ (F0)   z +1
2
q
^ 2
lF
n +
^ 2
F0
m ; ^ u(F11)   ^ (F0) + z +1
2
q
^ 2
F11
n +
^ 2
F0
m

Table 1.1 presents an application of the present analysis to the PROGRESA data
set. Column 1 introduces a parameter measuring the severity of poverty for the
FGT poverty measure described below. We use consumption as welfare indicator,
and the poverty line z is set equal to the median consumption for the control
group. We use an upper bound on the proportion of errors of 0.27, the proportion
of households who had not received benets from Progresa by 2000. Columns
2 and 3 presents treatment eects on poverty and 95% condence intervals for
this parameter, respectively, without taking into consideration the contamination
problem, that is to say, assuming that the parameter is point identied. Finally,
columns 4,5, and 6 introduce, respectively, upper and lower bounds on the PTE,
and Bonferroni condence intervals for the identication region.
Table 1.1: Identication regions and condence intervals for treatments eects on
poverty: PROGRESA 1999
 CI
0:95 l u CI
[l;u]
0:95
 = 0 -.068 [-.083,-.053] -0.278 0.092 [-0.296,0.105]
 =1 -0.039 [-.045,-.033] -0.148 0.009 [-0.153,0.015]
 = 2 -0.021 [-.025,-.017] -0.076 0.000 [-0.079,0.005]26
1.8.3 Monotone Treatment Response, Data Contamination,
and Missing Treatments
Monotonicity assumptions have been applied in other places to exploit their
identifying power. Manski (1997) investigates what may be learned about treat-
ment response under the assumptions of monotone, semi-monotone, and concave-
monotone response functions. He shows that these assumptions have identifying
power, particularly when compared to the situation where no prior information
exists. In a missing treatments environment, Molinari (2005b) shows that one can
extract information from the observations for which treatment data are missing
using monotonicity assumptions.
Given the design of PROGRESA, one should expect that the outcome of in-
terest (in our case consumption per capita) increases with program participation.
More formally, we should expect that y11  y10. We have the following result
Proposition 1.8 Suppose that y11  y10. Let it be known that p   < 1. Then
sharp bounds for (P11;z) and (P1;z) are given by the identication region
[(U;z);(Q(y);z)]
PROOF: See Appendix.
Table 1.2 introduces the eect of the monotonicity assumption on the identi-
cation region for PTE. Clearly, considering the monotonic eect of Progresa on
the treated population improves the inferential analysis of PTE by considerably
shrinking the identication region.27
Table 1.2: Identication regions under monotonicity assumptions: PROGRESA
1999
l u CI
[l;u]
0:95
 = 0 -0.278 -.068 [-0.296,-.053]
 = 1 -0.148 -0.039 [-0.153,-.033]
 = 2 -0.076 -0.021 [-0.079,-.017]
1.9 Application: Measurement of Rural Poverty in Mexico
The methodology developed in this paper is applied to the data obtained from
the 2002 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH) held by
INEGI (2002). This household income and expenditure survey is one of a series
of surveys that are carried out under the same days of each year using identical
sampling techniques.
The households are divided into zones of high and low population density. Low
density population zones are those areas with fewer than 2500 inhabitants. It
is common to identify these areas as rural ones. The rest of the zones (those
with more than 2500 inhabitants) are identied as urban areas. The sample is
representative for both urban and rural areas and at the national level. For the
purposes of this study, we will just concentrate on the rural sub-sample which
includes 6753 observations.
We have considered the extreme poverty line for rural areas constructed by
INEGI-CEPAL for the 1992 ENIGH, following the methodology applied by the
Ministry of Social Development in Mexico (2002) to inate both the poverty line
and all of the data into August 2000 prices. The rural poverty line is equal to
494.77 monthly 2002 pesos. In this paper we have used per capita current dis-
posable income as indicator of economic welfare.10 It is divided into monetary
10Due to lack of information, a nal transformation of the original data was28
and non-monetary income. The monetary sources include wages and salaries,
entrepreneurial rents, incomes from cooperatives, transfers, and other monetary
sources. Non-monetary incomes include gifts, autoconsumption, imputed rents,
and payments in kind.
The identication regions and the three dierent 95% condence intervals for
the class of FGT poverty measures are presented for both the contamination and
the corruption models in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. We have no estimate
of the frequency of data errors in the sample, so we present a sensitivity analysis
using dierent values of . The rst condence interval corresponds to the point
identied case ( = 0). It is based on the point estimator  1.96 times its standard
error. The second condence interval is equal to the estimator of the lower bound
minus 1.96, and the estimator of the upper bound plus 1.96 times their standard
errors. The third condence interval is the adjusted interval for the parameter
CN. We found that there is almost no dierence between the last two types of
condence intervals, that is to say, between the condence interval covering the
entire identication region and the one that provides the appropriate coverage for
the poverty measure.
1.10 Conclusions
This paper has introduced the problems of data contamination and data cor-
ruption into the context of poverty measurement. When a proportion of the data
is measured with error, a poverty measure cannot be point identied. However,
we have shown that for the class of additively separable poverty measures it is
required: we will assume that each household member obtains the same proportion
of total income as the others.29
Table 1.3: Identication regions and condence intervals for FGT poverty measures
under contamination model: Rural Mexico, 2002
 L
 U
 CI
0:95 CI
[L;U]
0:95 CI

0:95
 = 0
0.00 0.287 0.287 [0.276, 0.298]
0.01 0.282 0.289 [0.271, 0.300] [0.272, 0.299]
0.02 0.275 0.292 [0.265, 0.304] [0.266, 0.302]
0.03 0.268 0.294 [0.257, 0.306] [0.259, 0.304]
0.05 0.252 0.299 [0.241, 0.311] [0.243, 0.309]
0.07 0.234 0.304 [0.223, 0.316] [0.225, 0.314]
0.10 0.209 0.312 [0.198, 0.325] [0.200, 0.323]
 = 1
0.00 0.093 0.093 [0.089, 0.098]
0.01 0.088 0.094 [0.084, 0.099] [0.085, 0.098]
0.02 0.083 0.095 [0.079, 0.100] [0.080, 0.099]
0.03 0.077 0.096 [0.074, 0.101] [0.074, 0.100]
0.05 0.066 0.097 [0.062, 0.103] [0.063, 0.102]
0.07 0.055 0.099 [0.052, 0.106] [0.053, 0.105]
0.10 0.042 0.101 [0.039, 0.109] [0.040, 0.108]
 = 2
0.00 0.042 0.042 [0.040, 0.045]
0.01 0.038 0.043 [0.036, 0.046] [0.036, 0.045]
0.02 0.034 0.043 [0.032, 0.047] [0.033, 0.046]
0.03 0.031 0.043 [0.029, 0.048] [0.029, 0.047]
0.05 0.024 0.044 [0.022, 0.049] [0.022, 0.048]
0.07 0.018 0.045 [0.016, 0.050] [0.017, 0.050]
0.10 0.011 0.046 [0.010, 0.053] [0.011, 0.052]
possible to nd identication regions under very mild assumptions. In particular,
if there is an upper bound on the proportion of errors, we can obtain identication
regions that take the form of closed intervals.
We consider the problem of statistical inference when a poverty measure is
not point identied. Two type of condence intervals are applied in the present
study. For the rst type, we have developed Bonferroni's condence intervals that
cover the entire identication region with some xed probability. The second type
applies and extends the results of Imbens and Manski (2004) by covering the true30
Table 1.4: Identication regions and condence intervals for FGT poverty measures
under corruption model: Rural Mexico, 2002
 L
 U
 CI
0:95 CI
[L;U]
0:95 CI

0:95
 = 0
0.00 0.287 0.287 [0.276, 0.298]
0.01 0.279 0.296 [0.268, 0.307] [0.270, 0.306]
0.02 0.270 0.307 [0.259, 0.318] [0.261, 0.316]
0.03 0.260 0.316 [0.250, 0.327] [0.251, 0.325]
0.05 0.239 0.334 [0.229, 0.345] [0.231, 0.344]
0.07 0.218 0.352 [0.208, 0.364] [0.209, 0.362]
0.10 0.188 0.381 [0.179, 0.393] [0.180, 0.391]
 = 1
0.00 0.093 0.093 [0.089, 0.098]
0.01 0.087 0.103 [0.083, 0.108] [0.084, 0.107]
0.02 0.081 0.113 [0.077, 0.118] [0.078, 0.117]
0.03 0.075 0.123 [0.071, 0.128] [0.072, 0.127]
0.05 0.063 0.142 [0.059, 0.148] [0.060, 0.147]
0.07 0.051 0.162 [0.048, 0.168] [0.049, 0.167]
0.10 0.038 0.191 [0.035, 0.198] [0.036, 0.197]
 = 2
0.00 0.042 0.042 [0.040, 0.045]
0.01 0.038 0.052 [0.036, 0.055] [0.036, 0.055]
0.02 0.034 0.062 [0.032, 0.066] [0.032, 0.065]
0.03 0.030 0.072 [0.028, 0.076] [0.028, 0.075]
0.05 0.022 0.092 [0.021, 0.097] [0.021, 0.096]
0.07 0.016 0.112 [0.015, 0.117] [0.015, 0.116]
0.10 0.010 0.141 [0.009, 0.147] [0.010, 0.146]31
value of a poverty measure with at least some xed probability. We also consider
the problem of poverty comparisons, extending the methodology developed in the
rst part of the paper to a setting where two populations are compared in terms
of poverty.
The results obtained in the paper are illustrated by means of two applications.
The rst application analyzes the eect of contaminated data on poverty treatment
eects for an anti-poverty program in Mexico. The second application is a sensitiv-
ity analysis for the measurement of rural poverty in Mexico under dierent degrees
of data contamination and data corruption. The two empirical applications show
the importance of considering these types of data errors, when it is pertinent, to
get a more accurate measurement of the phenomenon of poverty.32
1.11 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1: We need to show that (U;z)  (P;z) and
(L;z)  (P;z) for all P 2 P. Set  (y;z) =  (y;z), so  (y;z) is a non-
decreasing function. By lemma 1.1, it suces to prove that U stochastically
dominates every member of P and L is stochastically dominated by every member
of that set. The rest of the proof is identical to proposition 4 in Horowitz and
Manski (1995)
Proof of Proposition 1.2: Take any probability distribution Q in P. Clearly,
the identication breakdown point for the head-count ratio is given by

H = minfHQ;1   HQg
Since j(y;z) = 0 for all y  z and j 2 D, we have that 
 
j = HQ for all poverty
measures in D. Next, I claim that 

j  1 HQ. Assume, towards a contradiction,
that 

j < 1   HQ. Dene  =


j +1 HQ
2 and let (cj) be the Dirac measure at cj.
Clearly, we have
j(L

j;z)  j(L;z)  j(L1 HQ;z)  j((cj);z) = cj
A contradiction. Hence, f

j;
 
j g  fHQ;1   HQg for all j 2 D, and the result
follows.
Lemma 1.2 Let P1 and P2 be two probability measures on (R;B), with B the Borel
sets of R. Dene the sets A1, A2, A3, where R = A1 [A2 [A3, supA2  inf A3,
A1 \ Ai = ?, i = 2;3, and
 = f(P1;P2) : P1(A) = P2(A);8A 2 B \ A1;P1(A3) = P2(A2) = 0g
Let (x) : R ! R be a measurable function and suppose there exists some z 2
A1 [ A2 with (x) = 0 for all x  z, and (x)  0, otherwise. Then:33
i) F2 rst order stochastically dominates F1, where F2 and F1 are the distribu-
tion functions implied by probability measures P2 and P1, respectively.
ii) EP2((x))  EP1((x)), 8(P1;P2) 2 
PROOF:
i) Straightforward
ii) Because (x) = 0 for all x 2 A3, we have:
EP1((x)) =
R
A1 (x)dP1 +
R
A2 (x)dP1
EP2((x)) =
R
A1 (x)dP2 +
R
A2 (x)dP2
Therefore, EP2((x))  EP1((x)) i
R
A1 (x)dP2 +
R
A2 (x)dP2 
R
A1 (x)dP1 +
R
A2 (x)dP1
,
R
A2 (x)dP2 
R
A2 (x)dP1
Since P2(A2) = 0 and (x)  0 the result follows.
Denition 1.4 A class G of subsets of 
 is called a -system if
i) 
 2 G
ii) If G1;G2 2 G and G1  G2 then D1 n D2 2 G.
iii) If fGng is an increasing sequence of sets in G, the
S1
n=1 Gn 2 G
Lemma 1.3 (Sierpinski 1928) If F is stable under nite intersections, and if G
is a -system with G  F, then G  (F)
Proof of Proposition 1.3: Dene (y) = 2(y;z)   1(y;z). We have
m2 =
Z
2(y;z)dL  
Z
2(y;z)dU
=
Z
1(y;z)dL +
Z
(y)dL  
Z
1(y;z)dU  
Z
(y)dU
= m1 +
Z
(y)dL  
Z
(y)dU34
By construction, there exist sets A1;A2 and A3 in R such that R = A1 [ A2 [
A3, supA2  inf A3, and PL(A3) = PU(A2) = 0. Moreover, (y)  0 for
all y. By lemma 1.2, it suces to show that (PL;PU) 2 . We have four
cases: A1 = [minfr();r(1   )g;maxfr();r(1   )g], A1 = (minfr();r(1  
)g;maxfr();r(1 )g],A1 = [minfr();r(1 )g;maxfr();r(1 )g), and A1 =
(minfr();r(1   )g;maxfr();r(1   )g). I will analyze just rst case. A simi-
lar argument works for the other three. Dene the sets A2 = ( 1;minfr();r(1 
)g) A3 = (maxfr();r(1 )g;1), and A1 = [minfr();r(1 )g;maxfr();r(1 
)g]. By inspection, we have PL(A3) = PU(A2) = 0. Let B(A1) be the
Borel sigma-eld on A1. I will show that PL(A) = PU(A) for all A 2 B(A1)
by applying a generating class argument. Write E for the class of all intervals
(minfr();r(1   )g;t], with t 2 A1. The following series of claims proves this
result:
Claim 1: (E) = B(A1)
Let O stand for the class of all open subsets of A1, so B(A1) = (O). Each
interval (minfr();r(1   )g;t] in E has a representation
T1
n=1(minfr();r(1  
)g;t + 1
n). (O) contains all open intervals, and it is stable under countable
intersections. Hence, E  B(A1). On the other hand, each open interval (a;t) on
A1 has a representation (a;t) =
S1
n=1(minfr();r(1 )g;t  1
n]
T
(minfr();r(1 
)g;;a]c, so O  (E) and thus (E) = B(A1).
Claim 2: D = fA 2 B(A1) : PU(A) = PL(A)g is a -system
i) A1 2 D follows from the fact that PU(A1) = PL(A1)g. ii) Let A1;A2 2 D.
By the properties of a probability measure, Pi(A1
T
Ac
2) = Pi(A1) + Pi(Ac
2)  
Pi(A1
T
Ac
2), i = 1;2. P1(A1
T
Ac
2) = P2(A1
T
Ac
2) follows after some algebraic
manipulations. Finally, we need to show that D is closed under increasing limits.35
Let fAng be an increasing sequence of sets in D and A =
S1
n=1 An. Dene a
sequence of indicator functions f1Ang. Clearly, this is a positive and increasing
sequence of functions. By the Monotone Convergence Theorem
lim
n!1
EPU(1An) = EPU(1A)
= EPL(1A)
= lim
n!1
EPU(1An)
hence PU(A) = PL(A).
Claim 3: D  E
By inspection, PL((minfr();r(1   )g;t]) = PU((minfr();r(1   )g;t]) for
all t 2 A1.
Since E is stable under nite intersections, by lemma 1.3 and claims 1, 2, and
3 we have D  (E) = B(A1). Hence D = B(A1).
Proof of Corollary 1.1: By Proposition 1.2 it suces to show that 1(y;z) 
2(y;z) for all y 2 (0;z). By continuity and monotonicity of 1(y;z) on [0;z] there
exists  2 (0;1) such that 1(y;z) = 1(0;z) + (1   )1(z;z) for all y 2 (0;z).
Therefore
f  1(y;z) = f(1(0;z) + (1   )1(z;z))
 f  1(0;z) + (1   )f  1(z;z)
 1(0;z) + (1   )1(z;z)
= 1(y;z)
Where I have made use of the convexity of f.
Proof of Corollary 1.3: Condition iv) is equivalent to have 1 = f 2 with
f0 > 0 and f00 > 0 (Pratt 1964). The result follows from corollary 1.1.36
Before proving the rest of Lemmas and Propositions, we introduce a number of
preliminary results. Let y1;y2;:::;yn be i:i:d: random variables with distribution
function F(y), and let y(1);y(2);:::;y(n) denote the order statistics of the sample.
Consider the trimmed mean given by
Sn =
1
[(   )n]
[n] X
i=[n]+1
y(i) (1.30)
where 0   <   1 are any xed numbers and [] represents the greatest integer
function. Let r() and r() be continuity points of F(y). Further, dene
G(y) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if y < r()
F(y) 
  if r()  y < r()
1 otherwise
and set
 =
Z 1
 1
ydG(y) (1.31)

2 =
Z 1
 1
y
2dG(y)   
2 (1.32)
Lemma 1.4 (Stigler 1973) Assume E(y2) < 1, then
n
1
2(Sn   )
d  ! N(0;(1   ) 2((1   )2 + (r()   )2(1   ))) if  = 1.
n
1
2(Sn   )
d  ! N(0;() 2(()2 + (r()   )2(1   ))) if  = 0.
Lemma 1.5 (de Wet 1976) Assume E(jyj3) < 1, then
sup


P
p
N
(Sn )
 < x

  (x)


  ! 0 if  = 1.
sup


P
p
N
(Sn )
 < x

  (x)


  ! 0 if  = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.4: Dene the events
An =

l : l  ^ l   z +1
2
^ l p
n
37
Bn =

u : u  ^ u + z +1
2
^ u p
n

From the denition of the condence interval, CI
[PL;PU]
 , and Bonferroni's in-
equality
P([l;u]  CI
[l;u]
 ) = P(An \ Bn)  P(An) + P(Bn)   1
By lemma 1.4
p
n(^ i i)
^ i
d  ! N(0;1), i = u;l. Thus
limn!1 Pr([l;u]  CI
[l;Pu]
 )  
and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.5: The result is a direct consequence of lemma 1.5,
and Lemma 4 in Imbens and Manski (2004). 
Lemma 1.6 If Xn
d  ! X = N(1;2
1) and Ym
d  ! Y = N(2;2
2), and if Xn is
independent of Ym for all n and m, then Xn + Ym
d  ! N(1 + 2;2
1 + 2
2).
Proof: Let Zn;m = Xn + Ym. By independence of Xn and Ym, its characteristic
function can be written as
'Zn;m(u1;u2) = 'Xn(u1)'Ym(u2)
By the Uniqueness Theorem we have
lim
n;m!1
'Xn(u1)'Ym(u2) = exp(iu11  
u2
12
1
2
)exp(iu22  
u2
22
2
2
)
= exp(
2 X
j=1
iujj  
1
2
2 X
j=1
u
2
j
2
j)
This expression corresponds to the characteristic function of the random vector
Z = (X;Y ), where Z is Gaussian. Moreover, X and Y are independent since
Cov(X;Y ) = 0. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1.7: Dene the events38
An;m =
n
lA   uB : z +1
2
p m
n+m^ lA + n
n+m^ uB  Yn;m
o
Bn;m =
n
uA   lB :  z +1
2
p m
n+m^ lA + n
n+m^ uB  Wn;m
o
Where Yn;m =
p nm
n+m(^ lA   ^ uB   lA + uB) and Wn;m =
p nm
n+m(^ uA   ^ lB  
uA + lB). Notice that Lemma 1.4 implies
i) limn;m!1
p nm
n+m(^ iA iA) = limn;m!1
p m
n+m
p
n(^ iA iA)
d  ! N(0;2
iA),
i = l;u
ii) limn;m!1
p nm
n+m(^ iB iB) = limn;m!1
p n
n+m
p
m(^ iB iB)
d  ! N(0;(1 
)2
iB), i = l;u
By applying Lemmas 1.4 and 1.7 together it is easy to show that Yn;m
d !
N(0;2
lA + (1   )2
uB) and Wn;m
d ! N(0;2
uA + (1   )2
lB). By Bonferroni's
inequality we have:
P([Dl;Du]  CI
[Dl;Du]
 )  P(An;m) + P(Bn;m)   1
Hence limn;m!1 P([Dl;Du]  CI
[Dl;Du]
 )   
Proof of Proposition 1.8: From Proposition 1 in Horowitz and Manski (1995)
P11(y1) 2 P11()  P \

Q(y)   00
1   
: 00 2 P

For all x 2 R, dene the indicator functions 1(y11  x) and 1(y10  x). By the
monotonicity assumption
1(y1  x)  1(y  x)
Taking expectations at both sides of this inequality, we have that
P(y1  x)  Q(y  x)
for all x 2 R. This imposes a restriction on the set P11() since all of the distri-
butions in this set must stochastically dominate the observed distribution Q(y).39
Hence
Max

0;
Q(y  x)   00(y0  x)
1   

 Q(y  x)
for all x 2 R. After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain that Q(y  x) 
00(y0  x), which provides a restriction on the set of feasible distributions 00.
Dene the set of distribution functions stochastically dominated by Q(y) by
D = f00 2 P : 00(y0  x)  Q(y  x);8xg
one can characterize the identication region for the distribution F(y11) under the
monotonicity assumption as follows:
P(y11) 2 P
M
11()  P \

Q(y)   00
1   
: 00 2 D

To prove the proposition, we just need to show that Q(y) 2 PM
11 and that this
distribution is stochastically dominated by all other distributions in PM
11 The rst
condition is trivially satised by dening 00 = Q(y), and hence we have that
Q(y) 2 PM
11(). Next, assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists some
distribution in PM
11() that does not stochastically dominate Q(y). Then, for some
x 2 R and some 0
00 2 D, we have
Min

1;
Q(y  x)   0
00(y0  x)
1   

> Q(y  x)
From where Q(y  x) > 0
00(y0  x), or 1 > Q(y  x) > 1 + (1   00), a
contradiction since 0
00 2 D and 00 is a probability measure.Chapter 2
On the Design of an Optimal Transfer
Schedule with Time Inconsistent
Preferences
4041
2.1 Introduction
Public transfers constitute a very important policy tool in developed and de-
veloping societies alike. From anti-poverty programs to unemployment insurance
benets, they play a very important role as a welfare enhancing mechanism.
Mainstream public economics analyzes the problem of designing an optimal
transfer schedule based on the assumption that individuals have an abundance
of psychological resources: unboundedly rational, forward looking, and internally
consistent.1 Particularly, it is assumed that individuals are unbounded in their self-
control and optimally follow whatever plans they set out for themselves. In this
paper, we investigate the optimal design of a transfer schedule when individuals
have self-control problems.
Economic theories of intertemporal choice generally assume that individuals
discount the future exponentially. In other words, the choices made between to-
day and tomorrow should be no dierent from the choices made between the days
200 and 201 from now, all else equal. However, experimental evidence suggests
that many individuals have preferences that reverse as the date of decision mak-
ing nears. Research on animal and human behavior has led scientists to conclude
that preferences are roughly hyperbolic in shape, implying a high discount rate
in the immediate future, and relatively lower rate over periods that are further
away (Ainslie 1992; Lowenstein and Thaler 1989). Moreover, there exists eld
evidence of present-biased preferences and time inconsistent behavior (DellaVigna
1An example of such approach applied in a dynamic setting is the article on un-
employment insurance written by Shavell and Weiss (1979). They characterize the
time sequence of benets that maximizes the expected utility of the unemployed.
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) study second best allocations in a static model
where government lacks full information about consumer types.42
and Malmendier 2003; Fang and Silverman 2004). Angeletos et al (2001) calibrate
the hyperbolic and exponential models using US data on savings and consumption,
nding that the former model better matches actual consumers' behavior. They
noticed that, in contrast to the exponential discounting model, hyperbolic house-
holds exhibit a high level of comovement between predictable changes in income
and changes in consumption. This type of behavior has also been found in empiri-
cal studies that show how consumption is often very sensitive to an income transfer
in the very short-run.2 Similar results have been found in developing countries,
particularly the development of commitment devices to face the time inconsistency
problem (Rutheford 1999; Ashraf, Gons, Karlan, and Yin 2003; Ashraf, Gons, Kar-
lan, and Yin 2006).
In this paper we present a very simple model that captures this phenomenon
within the context of designing an optimal transfer schedule. We refer to this
type of policy tool as a consumption maintenance program (CMP). The dynamic
economic environment we study has two actors: a policymaker whose goal is to
allocate an exogenous budget in order to maximize some welfare function, and
an agent who takes consumption-savings decisions over time and is borrowing
constrained. The policymaker is fully committed to his plan once it is established.
In contrast, the beneciary may be time-inconsistent and may not follow up his
2Stephens (2003) and Stephens (2002) study the consumption response to
monthly paycheck receipt in the United States and the United Kingdom, respec-
tively. Under the standard life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis, household
consumption should not respond to paycheck arrival. Nevertheless, he nds an
excessive response to paycheck receipt. In the case of the US, he shows how the
sensitivity is higher for households for which Social Security represents an impor-
tant proportion of their total income. In a similar study and using data on the
consumption patterns of food stamp recipients in the US, Shapiro (2005) presents
evidence of declining caloric intake over the 30-day period following the receipt of
food stamps.43
original consumption plan in the future.
Following a tradition in public economics, we begin the analysis with a rst-
best approach. We show that if program beneciaries are time inconsistent and
receive all the benets in just one payment, then the equilibrium consumption al-
location is always inecient. In other words, it could be possible, in principle, to
strictly increase the beneciary's welfare at some point in time, without decreas-
ing his welfare in other time periods. On the other hand, if the policymaker has
total exibility in the way he can allocate the public budget over time and can
impose negative lump-sum transfers, any ecient consumption allocation can be
obtained in equilibrium. Intuitively, the CMP is used as a commitment mechanism
by the policymaker in order to impose time consistency for some previously chosen
ecient consumption plan. We also characterize the set of feasible consumption al-
locations when lump-sum transfers are non-negative and the beneciary has access
to an exogenous and deterministic income ow. Therefore, we can nd an analogy
between the CMP and Laibson's golden eggs model (Laibson 1997a), where the
commitment technology takes the form of an illiquid asset.
In a more realistic scenario, the assumption that the beneciary's relevant in-
formation is public seems to be too strong. Income often cannot be observed by
the policymaker, especially in developing countries where the informal sector is
pervasive. Moreover, fully committing to some transfer schedule is not the best
policy ex-ante in an uncertain environment. Therefore, not only the policymaker
should consider his role as a commitment "enforcer", but also as an insurer that
helps beneciaries face the potential risk of receiving a negative income shock. We
introduce this concern into our model by assuming that while the policymaker
can observe the distribution of income shocks, he cannot observe their actual re-44
alizations. We approach this problem from a mechanism design perspective. The
solution we found represents the existent tradeo between a more committed versus
a more exible transfer schedule.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple dynamic
model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting into the problem of designing a transfer
schedule. Section 3 studies the problem from a rst-best perspective, assuming
the policymaker has full information and lump-sum transfers are feasible. Section
4 characterizes the optimal transfer schedule when the policy maker only knows
the distribution of income shocks. Section 5 concludes. Most of the mathematical
details are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
Consider the following economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1;2;:::;T.
There is one agent who lives for T  3 periods and one policymaker or planner.
There is one consumption good x. The instantaneous utility function u : R+ ! R
of the agent is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: u() is C2 over (0;1),
u0(x) > 0, and u00(x) < 0.
In period t, preferences over consumption streams x = (x1;:::;xT) 2 RT
+ are
representable by the utility function
Ut(x) = u(xt) + 
PT
=t+1  tu(x)
where (;) 2 (0;1]  (0;1]. There exists a linear storage technology with gross
return R > 0. The agent is liquidity constrained in the sense that he can save but
not borrow.
The type of preferences represented by this model incorporates the so-called45
quasi-geometric discounting3. The parameter  is called the standard discount
factor and it represents the long-run, time consistent discounting; the parameter
 represents a preference for immediate gratication and is known as the present-
biased factor. For  = 1 these preferences reduce to exponential discounting. For
 < 1, the (;) formulation implies discount rates that decline as the discounted
event is moved further away in time.4
In the present analysis, we assume that the agent is sophisticated in the sense
that she is fully aware of her time inconsistency problem. When preferences are
dynamically inconsistent, it is standard practice to formally model the agent as
a sequence of temporal selves making choices in a dynamic game. Similar to
Strotz (1956), Peleg and Yaari (1973), Goldman (1980), Laibson (1997b), Laibson
(1998), O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001), and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1993), we
model this problem by thinking of the agent as consisting of T autonomous selves
whose intertemporal utility functions are given by
U1 = u(x1) + u(x2) + 
2u(x3) + ::: + 
T 2u(xT 1) + 
T 1u(xT)
U2 = u(x2) + u(x3) + 
2u(x4) + ::: + 
T 3u(xT 1) + 
T 2u(xT)
U3 = u(x3) + u(x4) + 
2u(x5) + ::: + 
T 4u(xT 1) + 
T 3u(xT)
. . . =
. . .
Ut = u(xt) + u(xt+1) + ::: + 
T tu(xT)]
. . . =
. . .
UT = u(xT)
The government implements a consumption maintenance programme (CMP here-
3This type of preferences was originally proposed by Phelps and Pollack (1968).
4See Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002), for review of the (;)
formulation and its relation to hyperbolic discounting.46
after), which consists of allocating an exogenous budget B > 0 to the individual
through a transfer schedule ftgT
t=1. The government allocates this budget over
time in order to maximize the "long-run" welfare of the agent represented by the
function5
W(x1;:::;xt) =
T X
t=1

t 1u(xt) (2.1)
Intuitively, this welfare function represents the policymaker's preference for smoother
consumption paths.6 Following a tradition in the income maintenance program lit-
erature, we set aside the revenue-raising implications to nance this budget. We
have in mind a world in which the budget B is nanced by the non-target popula-
tion or by some other exogenous source of funding. For the purposes of the present
study, we abstract from the process of identifying the target population, focusing
exclusively on the allocation of benets.
5Three main approaches to evaluate welfare when preferences are time inconsis-
tent can be found in the literature. The rst approach, extensively applied in the
consumption-savings literature by Goldman (1979) and Phelps and Pollak (1968),
emphasizes the application of a Pareto criterion to evaluate equilibrium allocations.
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) advocate maximizing welfare from a "long-run per-
spective". It involves the existence of a "...(ctitious) period 0 where the person
has no decision to make and weights all future periods equally." This approach in-
corporates the fact that most models of present-biased preferences try to capture
situations in which people pursue immediate gratication. Moreover, they con-
sider the Pareto criterion as "too strong" because it often refuses strategies that
are preferred by almost all incarnations of the agent. In that sense, ranking strate-
gies becomes complicated since "...the Pareto criterion often refuses to rank two
strategies even when one is much preferred by virtually all period selves, while the
other is preferred by only one period self." Finally, there is a third approach that
privileges a subset C 2 2T of players. For instance, welfare may be evaluated with
respect to current self's perspective. This "dictatorship of the present" approach
has been applied by Cropper and Laibson (1998), and Cropper and Koszegi (2001),
where the goal of the policy maker at time t is to maximize the welfare of self-t.
6This type of analysis, where the policymaker has an objective function that
is dierent from that of the agent, is not new in public economics. As noticed by
Kanbur, Pirttila, and Tuomala (2004) "...there is a long tradition of non-welfarist
welfare economics...where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using
a preference function dierent from the one that generate the outcomes."47
2.3 First-Best Consumption Maintenance Programs
In this section, we establish a benchmark case by characterizing the optimal
CMP when the beneciary's income ow fytgT
t=1 can be observed by and lump-
sum transfers are feasible to the policymaker. Formally, the set of feasible transfer
schedules is given by
BF = f(1;:::;T) 2 RT :
PT
t=1 R1 tt = Bg
In contrast to a time-inconsistent beneciary, we assume that once the policymaker
decides which transfer schedule will be implemented, he is fully committed to that
program. We can formally model this problem as a two-stage game where the
players are the policymaker and the T dierent incarnations of the agent. In stage
1, the policymaker announces the transfer schedule to be implemented. In stage
2, the dierent incarnations of the agent play a consumption-savings game.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we introduce some useful concepts and
denitions as well as the equilibrium concept we will employ in this section. Let
!t be cash on hand. This variable evolves according to
!t+1 = R(!t   xt) + yt+1 + t+1
with !1 = 1 + y1. In the present study, we will focus on consumption strategies
in which the past inuences current play only through its eect on cash on hand,
so the equilibrium concept for the consumption-savings game is that of Markov
perfect equilibrium. A feasible consumption strategy for player t 2 f1;:::;Tg is
given by the function st : !t ! [0;!t].7 We say that an equilibrium allocation
x() is induced by a transfer schedule  2 BF if it is supported by some Markov
7More formally, we could denote by St the set of all feasible strategies for player
t 2 f0;1;:::;Tg and by S1  S2 :::  ST the joint strategy space of all players.48
perfect equilibrium of the consumption-savings game. A rst-best CMP is derived
from the solution to the two-stage game described above:
Denition 2.1  = (
1;:::;
T) 2 BF is a rst-best CMP if W(x())  W(x())
for every  2 BF, where x() 2 RT
+ and x() 2 RT
+ are equilibrium allocations
induced, respectively, by the transfer schedules  and .
2.3.1 Transfer Schedules without Commitment: The One-
Payment CMP
In this section, we study the behavioral implications and welfare outcomes of
one-payment CMP. We assume that the policy maker is constrained to transfer all
of the resources in period 1, where by all resources we mean the public budget B
plus the present value of the beneciary's future income ow.8 In some circum-
stances, this is equivalent to giving access to capital markets to the beneciary,
so he would be able to borrow money against his future income stream. Besides
being a benchmark case for comparisons, this seems to be the natural setup for
the analysis: administrative costs, technological constraints, and other types of im-
pediments may prevent the policymaker from distributing the budget with more
exibility.
One implication of assuming that the beneciary is time consistent ( = 1) is
that the optimal consumption path from self 1's perspective can be implemented
in equilibrium: his future incarnations will consume and save the amounts he
wants them to. Moreover, because the beneciary and the policy maker share the
same intertemporal preferences, an optimal CMP is to transfer the total budget
8This implicitly implies that negative transfers can be implemented. We will
weaken this assumption later on.49
in period 1. On the other hand, if the individual is time inconsistent ( < 1), this
may not be an ecient policy because, as we will see below, it could be possible
for the policymaker to weakly improve the welfare of the beneciary in all periods,
and to strictly increase his welfare at some period. The strategic interaction of
his dierent incarnations might generate a coordination failure with a suboptimal
outcome as a result.
In the present setting, it can be shown that for all  < 1 the equilibrium
allocation x 2 RT
++ is inecient from a long-run perspective: we can always nd
a period t < T such that reallocating consumption from t to some j > t implies a
welfare improvement. In other words, by transferring consumption from period t
to period j, not only could it be possible to increase the welfare of self t, but also
the welfare of their past and future incarnations.9 Notice that if the agent were
time consistent, this behavior should not be observed in equilibrium. Having time
inconsistent preferences is what opens the possibility of an inecient equilibrium.10
Proposition 2.1 establishes that, for the one-payment CMP, if the beneciary
is time inconsistent, then the equilibrium allocation is inecient11
9Therefore, this result also implies that the consumption allocation is not Pareto
optimal.
10In the context of a consumption-savings problem, Laibson(1996) shows how
damaging in terms of welfare the type of behavior implied by quasi-hyperbolic
discounting could be when the agent has a constant relative risk aversion utility
function. Based on his own calibration, he argues that inadequate access to optimal
savings policies translates in a welfare cost of at least 9
10 of one year income. He
discusses the positive eects of some policies to increase not only savings but also
the welfare of each of the dierent selves when the agent faces a time inconsistency
problem.
11Although there has been some progress in the characterization of equilibria
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the analysis of the welfare properties of those
equilibria has been limited to the case of constant relative risk aversion. Intuitively,
it is clear that the inecient property of the equilibrium of the game should not
be a consequence of assuming CRRA preferences. Under very general conditions,
Goldman (1979) shows that an interior equilibrium consumption allocation is e-50
Proposition 2.1 In the one-payment CMP with a time-inconsistent beneciary,
the consumption allocation, x() 2 RT
++, arising in equilibrium is inecient.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is very simple: if the policymaker transfers all of
the resources in just one payment, a time-inconsistent beneciary will nd himself
in a situation of overconsumption. In particular, it can be shown that self T-2
will always be overconsuming in the sense that it would be possible to increase his
welfare by transferring resources to the future. Since preferences are separable and
monotone, the equilibrium allocation is also inecient from a long-run perspective.
Interestingly, this result may sound counterintuitive for those who consider that
providing more liquidity to the poor is always the best policy. Our conjecture is
that a nal answer much depends on the specic goals of a CMP. For instance,
if the primary goal of a CMP is to smooth consumption over time, then a one-
payment CMP may not be an optimal policy if the beneciary is time inconsistent,
other things constant. On the other hand, if the objective of the policymaker
is to help beneciaries to better face some form of risk such as income shocks,
then transferring nancial support in as few payments as possible seems to be a
better policy, particularly if insurance markets do not work eciently. This type
of dilemmas will be analyzed more formally in section 4 where we create a second-
best environment in which the policymaker must face potential tradeos implied
by more committed, though less exible, transfer schedules.
cient if and only if it is best for the rst generation (self 1 in the current setting).
Therefore, our result is a kind of corollary to the main proposition in Goldman's
paper. More precisely, the stronger result we have obtained is a direct consequence
of assuming intertemporal separability as well as concavity and dierentiability of
the instantaneous utility function.51
2.3.2 Reestablishing Eciency through Transfer Schemes
In the present setting, we have shown that any equilibrium allocation is ine-
cient when the policymaker transfers all of the resources in just one payment. In a
rst-best scenario where the policymaker has full information, it seems reasonable
to expect that the best allocation from a long-run perspective can be obtained in
equilibrium.12 In fact, we will show that it is possible for the policymaker to im-
plement any Pareto ecient allocation x 2 RT
+ by doling out transfers such that
cash on hand is equal to the optimal consumption path: i.e. !t = t +yt = x
t, for
all t. Lemma 2.1 establishes this result more formally:
Lemma 2.1 If the policymaker has full information and there is total exibility
in the way transfers can be allocated over time, then any ecient consumption
allocation can be obtained in equilibrium. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect
equilibrium supporting this allocation.
PROOF: See Appendix.
We prove this proposition by applying the following line of logic. First, notice
that for any ecient allocation x 2 RT
++ the beneciary is not overconsuming
at any time period. Second, since he is not overconsuming, he has no incentive
to transfer resources to the future even if he actually could choose the point in
time at which these resources will be consumed. From here we obtain the result
that the ecient allocation arises as the equilibrium allocation. Intuitively, the
policymaker provides, through the lump-sum transfer scheme, a mechanism that
makes the beneciary commit to follow up an optimal consumption path.13
12Notice that the best allocation from a long-run perspective corresponds to the
allocation that would be chosen by the beneciary if he were time consistent.
13As a corollary to this Proposition, notice that it is always possible for the
policy maker to implement a CMP that Pareto dominates the one-payment CMP.52
Since the best allocation from a long-run perspective is ecient, the following
result is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.1:
Proposition 2.2 In a rst-best setting where negative transfers can be imple-
mented, the best allocation from a long-run perspective can be obtained in equi-
librium.
In a more realistic scenario, lump-sum transfers should be restricted to be non-
negative. Most consumption maintenance programs do not impose any type of
negative income transfer to their beneciaries. We formally incorporate this feature
by dening a new set BF
+ of feasible transfers:
BF
+ = f(1;:::;T) 2 RT :
PT
t=1 R1 tt  B;t  0 8tg
The following corollary is a simple extension of Proposition 2 to the case with
non-negative transfers.14
Corollary 2.1 Given an ecient consumption prole x 2 RT
+, if yt  x
t 8t, then
x can be implemented with non-negative transfers.
Intuitively, the larger the budget B is with respect to the present value of the
beneciary's income ow
PT
t=1 R1 tyt, the more control the policymaker has over
the ow of post-transfer income
PT
t=1 R1 t(yt + t). In consequence, the set of
ecient consumption schedules that can be implemented expands as B gets larger.
2.4 Second-Best Consumption Maintenance Programs
The assumption that the policymaker has full information with respect to the
beneciary's income sequence, though helpful to establish a benchmark case to
14This result is very easily obtained as an extension of Proposition 2 by setting
!t = x
t for all t. Since yt  x
t, the policymaker sets t = x
t   yt for all t. This is
a feasible choice since
P
t R1 t(x
t   yt) =
P
t R1 tt = B53
compare with, is clearly not representative of a more realistic CMP design. In-
comes are far from being perfectly observable, especially in developing countries.
Moreover, the assumption that the income process is deterministic does not seem
to be a reasonable one since the poor are likely to face a highly uncertain economic
environment. In this context, an optimal CMP should consider the existent trade-
o between bringing commitment to the beneciary with self-control problems and
providing an insurance mechanism that help him overcome the ups and downs of
everyday life. In other words, an optimal CMP should oer a package balancing
both insurance and commitment motives.
We introduce uncertainty into the model by assuming that income is indepen-
dently and identically distributed over time with probability distribution
yt =
8
> <
> :
yL with probability 
yH with probability 1   
where yH > yL. We say that the beneciary receives a negative income shock at
time t if yt = yL. Analogously, we say the beneciary receives a positive income
shock at time t if yt = yH. For tractability and to keep the analysis as simple as
possible we assume that the instantaneous utility function is exponential u(xt) =
 exp( xt). Let Et be the expectation operator conditional on all information
available at t, and let E( u(yt)) =  < 1
It is assumed that, while the policymaker knows the distribution of income
shocks, income realizations are not public information. Therefore, the ecient
allocation of resources is impeded by the problem of incentive compatibility: if
reporting a negative income shock in period t implies the reception of a higher
transfer, then it is very likely that the beneciary has an incentive to misreport
his current income shock when it is positive.54
Based on the revelation principle, the policymaker can restrict attention to
direct revelation mechanisms with the property that the beneciary truthfully
reports her true income yt.
For any period t, let i represent the transfer at time t when the beneciary
reports income shock i 2 fH;Lg, and let 0
i be the corresponding budget left at
t + 1. In period T   1, the policymaker solves the problem
max
L;H;0
L;0
H
[u(L+yL)+ET 1u(
0
L+yT)]+(1 )[u(H +yH)+ET 1u(
0
H +yT)]
subject to the following incentive-compatibility and resource constraints
u(L + yL) + ET 1u(
0
L + yT)  u(H + yL) + ET 1u(
0
H + yT) (2.2)
u(H + yH) + ET 1u(
0
H + yT)  u(L + yH) + ET 1u(
0
L + yT) (2.3)
L + R
 1
0
L  BT 1 (2.4)
H + R
 1
0
H  BT 1 (2.5)
where BT 1 is the budget left at time T   1. Dene by vT 1(BT 1) the value
function of this problem. By standard arguments, vT 1(BT 1) is strictly concave
and dierentiable.
Next, take any period t and suppose vt+1(Bt) is strictly concave and dieren-
tiable. Although the policymaker and the beneciary disagree on the amount of
discounting applied between t and t + 1, they both agree on the utility obtained
from t + 1 on. By applying a standard induction argument, we have that for all t
the planner solves the problem:
max
L;H;0
L;0
H
[u(L + yL) + vt+1(
0
L)] + (1   )[u(H + yH) + vt+1(
0
H)]55
subject to the following incentive compatible and budget constraints:
u(L + yL) + vt+1(
0
L)  u(H + yL) + vt+1(
0
H) (2.6)
u(H + yH) + vt+1(
0
H)  u(L + yH) + vt+1(
0
L) (2.7)
L + R
 1
0
L  Bt (2.8)
H + R
 1
0
H  Bt (2.9)
In what follows, we will characterize the equilibrium arising in the current set-
ting. First, we introduce the following result that states that when the beneciary
receives a "negative" income shock he must be transferred at least the same amount
than in the case where he receives a "positive" income shock in order to have an
incentive-compatible equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2 L  H in equilibrium.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The policymaker faces a tradeo: on the one hand, he must take into account
the fact that the beneciary has a self-control problem, implying that he has an
incentive to report yL when he actually received a positive income shock. On the
other hand, the policymaker plays the role of an insurer who should provide a
higher transfer when the agent receives a negative income shock. In other words,
the policymaker considers both benets and costs of implementing a more "com-
mitted", though less exible, CMP.
It was argued above that the self control problem can be parameterized by
: the lower this parameter, the stronger the preference for immediate gratica-
tion. In his role of insurer, the policymaker should consider some measure of risk
that considers somehow the dispersion of income shocks. We dene the following
measure of risk:56
  =  u(yH   yL) = exp( (yH   yL))
This measure integrates a constant  > 0, a measure of the degree or risk aversion
of the beneciary, and a measure of the dispersion of the income shock yH   yL.
This measure is based on the idea that a beneciary's sense of well being depends
on the risk he faces. We have the following result
Proposition 2.3 If income shocks are unobservable, then the optimal CMP is
designed as follows
i) If    : H = L (pooling equilibrium).
ii) If  >  : H < L (separating equilibrium).
PROOF: See Appendix.
Proposition 2.3 establishes that if the beneciary's self-control problem (param-
eterized by ) is relatively more serious than the vulnerability problem he faces
(parameterized by  ), then the policymaker optimally opts for a pooling equilib-
rium where he transfers  independently of the value that the income shock takes,
where  satises u0() = v0
t+1(Bt   ).
Income reports are a mechanism to extract private information that may be
helpful for the design of a more ecient transfer schedule in the presence of risk.
Specically, having information on actual realizations of income shocks makes con-
sumption smoothing an easier task for the policymaker. However, if the degree
of self control is too low, the policy maker's optimal response is to oer a non-
contingent transfer schedule. This is equivalent to commit to a transfer schedule
at period 0, before the consumption-savings game starts. Therefore, the value of
information is zero for low levels of self-control.57
2.5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the problem of designing an optimal transfer schedule when
the beneciary is a dynamically-inconsistent decision maker. When he has total
control over the resources from the beginning of the period under consideration, the
outcome is generally inecient. This questions the traditional view that providing
more liquidity to the poor and making capital markets work more eciently are
sucient conditions to generate ecient outcomes. In a world with imperfect
individuals, perfect markets may not generate the best possible equilibrium.
If the policymaker has full information and lump-sum transfers are not re-
stricted to be non-negative, then any ecient consumption allocation can be ob-
tained in equilibrium. By imposing constraints on future cash-on-hand, the poli-
cymaker is able to inuence the pattern of expenditure in future periods and, in
consequence, to reestablish eciency. Obviously, the set of ecient allocations
that can be obtained in equilibrium is more restricted when lump-sum transfers
cannot be negative: the policymaker has less inuence on the nal arrangement
of the income ow. However, for many, if not most, CMP the budget B repre-
sents an important proportion of the total amount of resources available to the
the beneciary. This fact provides the policymaker with more degrees of freedom
for reallocating resources and obtaining more ecient outcomes by means of ex-
ercising more control over the beneciary's income ow. In this sense, a transfer
schedule is a kind of commitment mechanism.
One potential drawback of this rst-best approach is that, although helpful to
establish a benchmark case, it does not provide an accurate description of the cir-
cumstances that a policymaker usually has to face when allocating benets to the
poor or the unemployed. Information is far from being public, and many charac-58
teristics of the beneciary, particularly income, are hidden information. Another
problem is that a reasonable goal of a CMP is to help beneciaries to face cer-
tain types of risk such as income shocks. This means that the policymaker faces
a dilemma since an optimal transfer schedule explicitly designed for dealing with
risky environments should be as exible as possible. However, if the beneciary has
self-control problems, the role of the policymaker as an insurer may imply impor-
tant trade-os with its role as a commitment provider. In fact, if the self-control
problem is relatively serious with respect to the degree of income uncertainty, the
value of obtaining information through income reports is likely to be very low, or
even negative if implementing such a mechanism implies some sort of cost such as
administrative and data collection costs.
Our analysis has several limitations and possible extensions. First, we do not
explicitly consider the possibility of social commitment mechanisms. This type of
mechanisms are likely to arise in small communities where individuals are closer
to each other and information is semi-public. In some communities, insurance
mechanisms among their members naturally arise. Should we expect the same
for social commitment devices such as peer pressure? Second, there may exist
less interventionist commitment technologies. For instance, the policymaker could
provide the beneciary with an illiquid instrument a la Laibson (1997). He could
also oer a more sophisticated mechanism where the beneciary has the option to
choose a transfer schedule from a menu. If he is aware of his self-control problem,
the nal consumption allocation would be the best from a current perspective, and
hence ecient. Third, the second-best results of this paper could be extended to
preferences outside the neighborhood of constant absolute risk aversion. Fourth,
it could be assumed that income shocks are not i.i.d., following instead another59
type of random process. In reality, income realizations may not be independent:
a bad draw may generate a series of bad draws. In fact, the analysis of poverty
traps in development economics is based on this type of dynamic mechanism.
It would be very interesting to nd out what the behavior of time inconsistent
beneciaries could be in such a scenario as well as to study the optimal response
of the policy maker. Finally, we could introduce naivete into the model and design
an optimal mechanism that takes into account the possibility of facing a mixture
of sophisticated and naive individuals within the target population.60
2.6 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 2.3 Let x 2 RT
+ be some equilibrium consumption allocation. If there
exist periods j and t, j > t, such that u0(x
t) < j tRj tu0(x
j), then the allocation
is inecient.
PROOF: First, we will show that there exists " > 0 such that u0(x
t   ") 
j tRj tu0(x
j +"). Dene the function (";) = u0(x
t  ") j tRj tu0(x
j +").
Since u() is concave and twice dierentiable, we have
0(";) =  u00(x
t   ")   Rj tu00(x
j + ")
which is strictly positive for all "  0. Since (";) is continuous, there exists
some " > 0 such that (0;) < (";)  0. Hence, by concavity of the utility
function, it follows that transferring " to period i strictly increases the welfare of
selves t to j keeping the welfare of selves j +1 to T constant since preferences are
strictly monotone and separable. Next, we claim that the welfare of selves 1 to
t   1 strictly increases by transferring such amount of consumption from period
t to period j. By a similar argument to the one presented above, it suces to
show that (0;) < 0 implies that t u0(x
t) j Rj tu0(x
j) < 0, or equivalently
t (0;1) < 0, and that for any " > 0 satisfying (";)  0 we have t (";1) 
0, for all  2 f1;:::;t   1g. This follows immediately since t (";1)  (";)
for all "  0 and  2 (0;1].
Lemma 2.4 An allocation x 2 RT
+ satisfying
u0(xT 2)  max[Ru0(xT 1);2R2u0(xT)]
cannot be an equilibrium allocation.61
PROOF: Dene the set  = f 2 R3 j T 2 = 1;T 1  0;T  0;T 1 + T =
 1g, and the function '() = u(x
T 2+T 2)+
PT
t=T 1 t T+2u(x
t+RT 2 tt).
Taking the second derivative of the function '() we have
'00() = u00(x
T 2 + ) + R22
T 1u00(x
T 1 + RT 1) + R32
Tu00(x
T + RT)
which is clearly strictly negative for all  2 , and, in consequence, strictly concave.
Hence, () = argmax2R+ '() is a continuous function on  by the Maximum
theorem. Taking the rst derivative of '() and evaluating it at  = 0, we have
'
0(0) = u
0(xT 2 + RT 1u
0(x

T 1) + R
2Tu
0(x

T)
= u
0(x

T 2 + T 1Ru
0(xT 1) + T
2R
2u
0(xT)
> u
0(x

T 2)   max[Ru
0(xT 1);
2R
2u
0(xT)]
 0
Where the last inequality follows from the initial hypothesis. This shows that the
optimum is strictly positive on : i.e. () > 0, for all  2 . Since  is a compact
set, () attains its minimum on  by Weierstrass theorem. Let  = min2 (),
and take any   2 (0;).
Let st(!) be the consumption strategy of self t when cash on hand at that period
is equal to !, and dene T 1 = s
T 1(!T 1    )   s
T 1(!T 1). By the argument
above, s
T 2(!T 2)+  is an optimal deviation if (1;
T 1
  ;
T 1
   1) 2 . In period
T, the agent will consume all resources left. Thus, her equilibrium strategy is given
by sT(!) = !, so all we need to show is that
T 1
  2 [0;1]. In period T-1, there is
no dynamic inconsistency, so the optimal strategy is obtained by solving
sT 1(!) = argmaxu(xT 1) + u(xT)
subject to the constraint xT 1 + R 1xT = !. First order conditions are given by62
u0(sT 1(!)) = Ru0(!   sT 1(!))
Dierentiating with respect to ! at both sides of the equality, and after some
algebraic manipulations, we obtain
s0
T 1(!)
1 s0
T 1(!) =
u00(! sT 1(!))
u00(sT 1(!))
Since u() is strictly concave, we must have s0
T 1(!) 2 (0;1). By the Mean Value
Theorem, there exists  2 (!T 1    ;!T 1), such that
T 1
 = s0()  1. Hence
(1;
T 1
  ;
T 1
    1) 2  and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 2.3
and 2.4. 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: First, we show that  = x arises as the equilibrium
allocation. Let s be a Markov perfect equilibrium of the post-transfer game.
In order to prove the result, it suces to show that s
t(t) = t for all t, where
 = x 2 RT
+ is some ecient allocation. For period T, it is trivially true that
this is the best strategy since player T will consume all resources on hand. Next,
assume s
j(j) = j for all j > t. I claim that optimal strategy for player t implies
s
t(t) = t. Assume, towards a contradiction, that s(t) = t   ", for some " > 0,
and let (t   ";x0
t+1;:::;x0
T) be the new consumption allocation from period t to
T. Since players t + 1 to T are playing the strategy sj(j) = j by hypothesis,
notice that, for any " > 0, all of them have the option of obtaining a utility of
at least Uj(j;j+1;:::;T), and hence Uj(x0
j;x0
j+1;:::;x0
T)  Uj(j;j+1;:::;T),
for all j 2 ft;:::;Tg, with strict inequality for player t + 1 since u() is strictly
monotone and !t+1 = t+1 + ". This implies that (1;:::;t 1;t   ";x0
t+1;:::;x0
T)
Pareto dominates (1;:::;T), a contradiction. Next, we show uniqueness. I claim63
that any ecient allocation x 2 RT
+ satises:
u
0(x

t)  (R)
u
0(x

t+)
for all t;  1. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exist 0 and t0 such
that this condition does not hold. Then
u
0(x

t0) < (R)
u
0(x

t+0)
This implies that x cannot an ecient allocation since, by concavity of u(), there
exists " > 0 satisfying
u
0(x

t0   ")  (R)
u
0(x

t+0 + ")
Which is clearly a Pareto improvement. Uniqueness follows from Theorem 1 in
Laibson (1997b).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Dene V (x) = vt+1(x), and notice that 
0
i = R(Bt 
i) and u(i + yi) =  u(i)u(yi), i = L;H. Assume, towards a contradiction, that
(L) > (H). From the incentive compatible constraints we have
u(yH) 
V (
0
H) V (
0
L)
u(H) u(L)
and
u(yL) 
V (
0
H) V (
0
L)
u(H) u(L)
Hence u(yH)  u(yL), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. It is easier to analyze the problem if we rst dene
some variables. Let  = Ej[ u(yt)], 'L =  u(yL), and 'H =  u(yH). Moreover,
make the following change of variables: instead of having L and H as our decision
variables, let the decision variables be uH = u(H), u0
H = v(0
H), uL = u(L) and
u0
L = v(0
L). Since an exponential utility function can be decomposed as u(y+x) =
 u(y)u(x) and after some algebraic manipulations, the problem becomes64
max ['LuL + u0
L] + (1   )['HuH + u0
H]
s.t.
'LuL + u
0
L   'LuH   u
0
H  0
uH + u
0
H   'HuL   u
0
L  0
B   V1(uL)   R
 1V2(u
0
L)  0
B   V1(uH)   R
 1V2(u
0
H)  0
where V1 and V2 are the inverse functions of u() and v(), respectively. The
Lagrangean for this problem is given by the function
L = (uL;uH;u
0
Lu
0
H) +
4 X
i=1
ii(uL;uH;u
0
Lu
0
H)
where () represents the objective function, while i corresponds to constraint i,
starting from above. Because u() and v() are concave functions, Vi : R ! R,
i = 1;2, is convex. Hence, i, i = 1;:::;4 is concave.
Notice that the objective function is linear, so by the Theorem of Kuhn and
Tucker, u = (uH;u0
H;uL;u0
L) is a solution to the problem above if and only if there
is  = (
1;
2;
3;
4) 2 R4
+, where 
i is the corresponding multiplier for constraint
i, i = 1;:::;4, such that the following Kunh-Tucker rst order conditions hold:
'L + 1'L   2'H   3V
0
1(uL) = 0 (2.10)
 + 1   2   3R
 1
 1V
0
2(u
0
L) = 0 (2.11)
(1   )'H   1'L + 2'H   4V
0
1(uH) = 0 (2.12)
(1   )   1 + 2   4R
 1
 1V
0
2(u
0
H) = 0 (2.13)
In a pooling equilibrium the policymaker solves
max

[u( + yL) + vt 1(R(B   ))] + (1   )[u( + yH) + vt 1(R(B   )]65
After some algebraic manipulations, this problem is equivalent to solve
max

u() + vt 1(R(B   ))
The solution is implicitly given by u0() = Rv0(0), where 0 = R(B   ). This
implies

 1R
 1V
0
2 = 
 1V
0
1
Given this condition, the Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions for a pooling equilib-
rium can be rewritten as follows
'L + 1'L   2'H = v13 (2.14)
 + 1   2 = 
 1v13 (2.15)
(1   )'H   1'L + 2'H = v14 (2.16)
(1   )   1 + 2 = 
 1v14 (2.17)
From equations 14)-16) or 17)-18) we have:
2 =
(   'L)
   'H
+
   'L
   'H
1 (2.18)
From where it can be concluded that necessary and sucient conditions for having
positive 1 and 2 multipliers are
'L >  (2.19)
1 
(   'L)
'L   
(2.20)
Positive 3 and 4 are obtained if and only if the following conditions are satised
'L + 1'L   2'H  0 (2.21)
 + 1   2  0 (2.22)
(1   )'H   1'L + 2'H  0 (2.23)
(1   )   1 + 2  0 (2.24)66
equivalently
2 
'L
'H
+
'L
'H
1 (2.25)
2 


+ 1 (2.26)
2   (1   ) +
'L
'H
1 (2.27)
2   
1   

+ 1 (2.28)
Condition (25) implies condition (26). Therefore, expressions 18)-20), 25), and
27)-28) together provide a set of necessary and sucient parametric restrictions
for a pooling equilibrium to exist.
Conditions 18) and 25) imply:
1 
'L   'H
('H   'L)
(2.29)
which is trivially satised for any 1  0. Conditions 18) and 27)-28) are satised
if and only if:
1  (1   )
'H
'H   'L
1   

(2.30)
Therefore, all of these conditions above are satised if and only if
(1   )
'H
'H   'L
1   


(   'L)
'L   
(2.31)
and condition (19) are satised.
Dene the function
() =
1   

('L   )
Condition (31) can be rewritten as follows
() 

1   
'H   'L
'H
(   'L) (2.32)
Dene by  the value of  that makes equation (31) hold with equality. After
some manipulations, we have  =
'L
'H. Since () is strictly decreasing in the set67
[0;
'L
 ), and  <
'L
 , we have that condition (32) is satised if and only if   .
This completes the proof.Chapter 3
Does Conditionality Generate
Heterogeneity and Regressivity in
Program Impacts?
The Progresa Experience
6869
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTS) constitute a key ele-
ment of many anti-poverty programs around the world. Following Das, Do, and
Oler (2004), a conditional cash transfer scheme can be broadly dened as "...any
scheme requiring a specied course of action in order to receive a benet as a
conditional cash transfer". Examples of programs implementing CCTS are Opor-
tunidades in Mexico, Red de Proteccion Social in Nicaragua, and Bolsa Familia in
Brazil. The aim of these programs is to alleviate today's poverty by transferring
money to poor families, and to short-circuit tomorrow's, by making the transfers
conditional. The conditionality usually operates through lower bounds on human
capital investment which takes the form of requiring a minimum attendance rate
to school, and constant health monitoring for the children.
What is the rationale behind imposing a conditionality to the beneciaries of
a social program? if individuals are rational, there are no externalities, and pol-
icymakers have full information, then there is no case for implementing CCTS.
However, these conditions are rarely met. If individuals are not fully rational, im-
posing a conditionality may help them to increase their own welfare. For instance,
if a beneciary is time inconsistent, then if may be optimal to impose the condition
that transfers should be received in several payments.1 If information is asymmet-
ric in the sense that the policymaker does not have some relevant information of
the beneciaries such as income and asset holdings, then CCTS can be used as
a screening mechanism with the specic purpose of improving the targeting e-
ciency of the program. For example, if the conditioned-on good is inferior, richer
households are more likely to be screened out of the program (Besley and Coate
1See chapter 2 in this dissertation.70
1992).
There is a third rational for CCTS. In the presence of externalities, individuals
do not internalize the eect of their choices on others. By imposing a conditionality,
policymakers may be able to move individuals towards a more ecient equilibrium.
One notorious case is that of child labor and human capital investment: parents
usually decide children's time allocation between education and work. Since the
economic benets of child labor are immediately felt, and the economic benets of
education are only feasible in the long run, parents may not internalize the benets
of human capital investment in their children. Therefore, CCTS can be used in
this case to restore eciency by imposing lower bounds on variables such as school
attendance.
Although CCTS may help policymakers to reach a more ecient economy and
to reduce poverty in the long run by increasing investments on human capital
today (so the children of the poor may escape poverty in the future), they could
imply a tradeo between the equity and eciency goals of policymakers, at least
in the short run. In particular, if the conditioned-on good is normal, then worse
o households may be receiving less "eective" transfers than other groups of
beneciaries if participating in the program imposes some sort of opportunity cost
such as foregone wages from child labor.
A good example of this tension is The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh.
This program gives stipends to girls who attend at least 85% of classes at a sec-
ondary school level with the explicit goal of increasing investment on human capi-
tal. All girls can participate in this program independently of their socioeconomic
background. Since education is usually a normal good, richer households are more
likely to enroll their daughters in secondary schools than households in the low71
tail of the income distribution. Besides, the opportunity cost of enrolling a child
into school or making the 85% lower bound on school attendance is more likely to
exceed the benets obtained from the stipend for the poorest households. Khand-
ker et al (2003) notice that the "...untargeted stipend disproportionally aects the
school enrollments of girls from households with larger land wealth. Targeting to-
wards the land poor may reduce the overall enrollment gains of the program while
equalizing enrollment eects across landholding classes."
Despite the potential eects that CCTS programs have on the distribution
of treatment eects, most existing research on program evaluation of anti-poverty
programs focuses on mean impacts. There are, however, some studies for developed
countries that take the issue of heterogeneity in program impacts into account. In
an excellent study about heterogeneity in program impacts, Heckman, Smith and
Clements (1997) nd strong evidence of heterogeneous impacts when evaluating
the US Job Training Partnership Act. In a similar spirit, Bitler, Gelbach, and
Hoynes (2003) study the Connecticut's Job First program; they conclude that
this welfare program exhibits a lot of heterogeneity in program impacts, just as
predicted by standard labor supply theory.
In this paper, we study the distribution of program impacts in Progresa, re-
cently renamed Oportunidades. This anti-poverty program was introduced by the
Mexican government in 1997 and provides conditional cash transfers to poor fam-
ilies. Similar to The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh, the conditioned-on
good is school attendance which, not surprisingly, is a normal good in the case of
Mexico (Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas 2000). We take advantage of the experimental
design of the evaluation sample to identify the parameters of interest for this study.
Our empirical ndings can be summarized in two main points. First, there is72
strong evidence that heterogeneity in program impacts is a common phenomenon
in Progresa. Second, under the assumption of perfect positive dependence, and
consistent with the model developed in this paper, better o households tend to
receive larger positive program impacts than poorer households.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Progresa, the evaluation
sample, and the selection of beneciaries. Section 3 develops a simple household
bargaining model of child labor and human capital accumulation, and discusses
its connection with CCTS. Section 4 briey analyzes the evaluation problem and
presents average treatment eects of the program as a benchmark case. Section
5 develops some tests for homogeneity in program impacts. Section 6 imposes a
specic type of monotonicity assumption: rank preservation, and makes this as-
sumption operational through the estimation of quantile treatment eects (QTE).
Section 7 concludes. Mathematical details, algorithms, and proofs are in the Ap-
pendices.
3.2 Progresa
In 1997, the Mexican government introduced the Programa de Educacion, Salud
y Alimentacion (the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program), better known
as Progresa, and recently renamed Oportunidades, as an important element of its
more general strategy to eradicate poverty in Mexico. The program is characterized
by a multiplicity of objectives such as improving the educational, health, and
nutritional status of poor families.
Progresa provides cash transfers, in-kind health benets, and nutritional su-
plements to beneciary families. Moreover, the delivery of the cash transfers is
exclusively through the mothers, and is linked to children's enrollment and school73
attendance. The conditionality works as follows: in localities where Progresa op-
erates, those households classied as poor with children enrolled in grades 3 to 9
are eligible to receive the grant every two months. The average bi-monthly pay-
ment to a beneciary family amounts to 20 percent of the value of bi-monthly
consumption expenditures prior to the beginning of the program. Moreover, these
grants are estimated taking into account the opportunity cost of sending children
to school, given the characteristics of the labor market, household production, and
gender dierences. By the end of 2002, nearly 4.24 million families (around 20
percent of all Mexican households) were incorporated into the program. These
households constitute around 77 percent of those households considered to be in
extreme poverty.
3.2.1 Data: A Quasi-Experimental Design
Because of logistical and nancial constraints, the program was introduced
in several phases. This sequentiality in the implementation of the Progresa was
capitalized by randomly selecting 506 localities in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo,
Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi and Veracruz. Of the 506 localities,
320 localities were assigned to the treatment group and the rest were assigned to
the control group. In total, 24,077 households were selected to participate in
the evaluation sample. The rst evaluation survey took place in March 1998,
2 months before the distribution of benets started. 3 rounds of surveys took
place afterwards: October/November 1998, June 1999, and November 1999. The
localities that served as control group started receiving benets by December 2000.
For the empirical application of the methodologies developed in this paper, we will
make use of the June 1999 round.74
3.2.2 Progresa's selection of localities and beneciary house-
holds
Progresa's methodology to identify potential beneciaries consists of two two
main stages: (1) the selection of localities; (2) the selection of beneciary house-
holds within selected localities. For the rst stage, a marginality index was con-
structed for each locality in Mexico. Based on this index, localities deemed to have
a high marginality level and with more than 50 and less than 2,500 inhabitants
were considered priorities for the program. Finally, budgetary constraints as well
as program components that require the presence of school and clinics for the im-
plementation of the program were considered to select the group of localities to
be covered by the Progresa. For the second stage, a census, ENCASEH (Encuesta
de Caracteristicas Socioeconomics de los Hogares), was conducted in each of the
selected localities. Using this data, a measure of monthly per capita income per
household was constructed subtracting child income from total household income.
A poverty line of 320 pesos per capita per month was employed to create a new
binary variable taking the value of 1 if household's monthly per capita income was
below 320 pesos and 0 otherwise. Finally, discriminant analysis was employed for
each geographical region. By doing so, it was possible to identify the variables
that discriminate best between poor and non-poor households, and a rule to clas-
sify households as poor or non-poor was developed by estimating a discriminant
score for each household.75
3.3 A Simple Model of Human Capital Investment and
CCTS
In this section, we present a simple model of child labor and human capital
investment. Our objective is to shed some light on the connection between these
variables and CCTS. We build this model as an extension of Baland and Robin-
son (2000), although we do not adopt a unitary view of the household. Similar
to Kanbur and Haddad (1997) and Martinelli and Parker (2003), we adopt a bar-
gaining perspective for the intra-household resource allocation problem.
3.3.1 One-Sided Altruism
We consider a one-good economy. The single good in this economy is produced
with the linear technology
Y = L (3.1)
where L is labor input measured in eciency units of labor. We assume that the
labor market is perfectly competitive.
There is a continuum of households who live for two periods, t = 1;2. Each
of these households is composed by a man, a woman, and a child. We will refer
to the man and the woman together as the parents for the rest of the section. In
period 1, parents are characterized by their income generating ability a, where a
also represents eciency units of labor. We assume that households are distributed
uniformly on [a;a], with each household inelastically supplying a eciency units
of labor per period.
In period 1, the child is endowed with one unit of time. Parents decide how to
allocate the child's time between child labor, l, and human capital accumulation,76
h. They also decide how much to leave as a bequest to the child, b. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that l is measured in eciency units of labor, so the child
is endowed with one eciency unit of labor in period 1. In the second period, the
child's income generating ability is given by (h), where h = 1   l and () is C2,
strictly increasing, and strictly concave function dened on [0;1], with (0) = 1,
0(1) < 1, and 0(0) > 1. This technology implies that the ecient investment
level on human capital, ho, is given implicitly by 0(ho) = 1.2
Let (x1f;x2f) and (x1m;x2m) denote the consumption levels of the father and
the mother for periods 1 and 2, respectively. The child is assumed to consume only
in period 2, with consumption level denoted by xc. The woman cares only about
her own consumption and the consumption of the child; similarly, the man cares
only about his own consumption and the consumption of the child. The father's
preferences are represented by
Wf = (lnx1f + lnx2f) + (1   )lnxc (3.2)
and the mother's preferences are given by
Wm = (lnx1m + lnx2m) + (1   )lnxc (3.3)
where 1 >  >  > 0.
Besides choosing the time allocation of the child, parents can also decide to
make positive bequests to him. We denote these bequest by b 2 R+. Parents have
access to a storage technology, so they can transfer resources between periods by
saving. We denote the household's saving level by s. Households are borrowing
constrained in the sense that parents can save but not borrow. Therefore, parents
2In other words, ho is the level of human capital that maximizes the household's
intertemporal income.77
face the budget constraints
x1f + x1m = a + l   s (3.4)
x2f + x2m = a + s   b; (3.5)
and
xc = (1   l) + b (3.6)
Decisions about x1f;x2f;x1m;x2m;xc;b, and s are made by the parents in the rst
period by solving a generalized Nash bargaining problem with solution given by the
following program
Max(x

1fx

2fx
1 
c   uf)
(x

1mx

2mx
1 
c   um)
1  (3.7)
The paremeter  2 (0;1) introduces asymmetry into the model. The ratio

1  can
be interpreted as as the relative bargaining power of the father with respect to the
mother. uf and um are referred to as threat points or disagreement points. For
the rest of the analysis we assume uf = um = 0.
Proposition 3.1 If savings and bequests are interior, then parents are investing
the ecient level of human capital on the child. Moreover, human capital is a
normal good.
PROOF: See Appendix.
3.3.2 Two-Sided Altruism
We now introduce a particular form of altruism from children to parents. We
will show that the results we obtained above can be extended to this new setting.78
We assume that children derive utility both from consumption in the second period
and from any transfer to their parents:
Wc =  lnxc + (1   )ln
c (3.8)
where xc is child's consumption when adult, c is the transfer given to the parents,
and  2 (0;1).
Household choices are timed as follows. In period 1, parents choose investment
on human capital and saving. Period 2 is divided in two subperiods. In the rst
subperiod, they choose the level of bequests. In the second subperiod, children
decide how much to transfer to their parents. Therefore, they face the following
budget constraint:
xc + 
c = (1   l) + b (3.9)
We solve for the equilibrium by backward induction. For the second subperiod, it
is easy to show that children choose the following levels of own consumption and
transfers to their parents:
xc = ((1   l) + b) (3.10)

c = (1   )((1   l) + b) (3.11)
Since both parents are assumed to be forward looking, parents anticipate the
eect that their current decisions have both on child consumption and the transfers
received from him. Therefore, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem is given
by the solution to
Max(x

1fx

2f((1   l) + b)
1 )
(x

1mx

2m((1   l) + b)
1 )
1  (3.12)79
subject to the constraints
x1f + x1m = a + l   s (3.13)
x2f + x2m = a + s + (1   )(1   l)   b (3.14)
Proposition 3.2 In the model with two-sided altruism, if savings and bequests
are interior, then parents invest the optimal level of human capital on the child.
Moreover, human capital is a normal good.
PROOF: See Appendix.
3.3.3 Conditional Cash Transfers: Eciency vs Equity
We now introduce a social planner whose objective is to help households to
invest the optimal amount of human capital ho on the child. The planner imple-
ments the following policy: It provides a transfer   to all households that invest
at least the optimal level of human capital. Formally,
 =
8
> <
> :
  if h  ho
0 otherwise
Let V ( ;a;lo) denote the indirect utility of a household with income generating
ability a if it accepts the conditionality imposed by the policymaker. Similarly, let
V (0;a;l(a)) denote its indirect utility if it does not, where l(a) is the optimal
choice of child labor for a household that does not participate in the program.
Clearly, a household will accept the conditionality if V ( ;a;lo) V (0;a;l(a)) > 0.
If child labor is an inferior good, or equivalently, human capital investment is a
normal good, it can be shown that this dierence is increasing on a, so better
o households are more likely to accept the conditionality. Since the opportunity80
cost of participating in the program is given by the foregone income coming from
child labor, l(a)   lo, the eective transfer received by a household with income
generating ability a is given by:

e(a) =
8
> <
> :
  + lo   l(a) if V ( ;a;lo)) > V (0;a;l(a))
0 otherwise
Clearly, eective transfers e(a) are non-decreasing on a for households partic-
ipating in the program.3 Therefore, within this group, better o households tend
to receive a larger positive impact from the program.
More generally, we can distinguish three types of households with choices de-
pending on their income generating ability a. The rst type of household invests
less than the optimal level of human capital ho even when the CCTS is available, so
it does not receive any transfer at all. The second type of household was investing
less than the optimal level ho before the scheme was available, but increases its
investment level to ho once he becomes a beneciary of the program. Finally, the
third type of household was already investing the optimal level of human capital,
so it always participate in the program since it represents a pure income transfer
to the household.
3.4 The Evaluation Problem
Although randomization helps to answer many of the questions raised by pol-
icymakers, there are many other questions that remain unanswered, in particular
those related with the distribution of program impacts across the population of
beneciaries.
3Given the assumptions of the model, in particular the concavity of (), for
any level of generating ability a, lo is a lower bound for the optimal choice of child
labor: i.e. l(a)  lo81
To formalize the inferential problem, let each member j of population J be
exposed to a mutually exclusive and exhaustive binary set of treatments T = f0;1g,
and have a response function yj(t) : T ! R mapping treatments into outcomes.
The population is a probability space (J;
;P) and y() : J ! R  R is a random
variable mapping the population into their response functions. Therefore, there
exist two potential states of the world for each member j of J: (yj(0);yj(1)).
Lets denote program participation by the indicator variable dj, where dj = 1
indicates program participation, and dj = 0 otherwise. The analyst observes dj,
but he cannot observe yj(0) and yj(1)) simultaneously. More formally, he observes
yj = djyj(1) + (1   dj)yj(0). The fact that one cannot observe both outcomes for
each individual is known as the evaluation problem.
3.4.1 Average Treatment Eects
Following the traditional approach in the program evaluation literature, the
average treatment eect on the treated (ATE) is given by
 = E[y(1)   y(0)jd = 1] (3.15)
Randomization guarantees the identication of ATE since we have P(y0 j d = 1) =
P(y0 j d = 0). In fact, it turns out that ATE can be consistently estimated under
the weaker assumption that d is independent of y(0).4
Columns 2 and 3 reports estimated mean outcomes for treatment and control
samples, respectively. The rst two rows concern total per capital expenditure
and total per capita purchase of food items. The fourth column provides average
treatment eects of the program on each of these variables. These results show
4To see this point, decompose the dierence E[y(1)] E[y(0)] as follows E[yjd =
1]   E[yjd = 0)] = E[Y (0)jd = 1]   E[y(0)jd = 0] +  = .82
that the eect of Progresa on total monthly per capita expenditure was about
26 pesos (a 15% mean eect), while its ATE on total monthly per capita food
purchase was about 20 pesos. These treatment eects are statistically signicant
at the 1% level.
Table 3.1: Per Capita Mean Outcomes and Treatment Eects
Outcome Treatment Control  95% CI
(n=6946) (m=4098)
Total Expenditure 202.815 176.341 26.474 [20.731,32.217]
(3.410)
Food Purchase 148.385 128.4156 19.970 [16.149,23.790]
(2.028)
From the discussion on the program evaluation problem, we know that the
identication of the joint distribution P(y1;y0) is, in general, not possible. There
is a case, however, where one can identify the distribution of program impacts
P(y1 y0). The dummy-endogenous-variable model (Heckman 1978) assumes that
yj(1) = yj(0) + 
Dening  as the treatment eect, this assumption implies homogeneous treatment
responses. Therefore, the distribution of program impacts is the Dirac measure at
:
P(y(1)   y(0) j d = 1) = P( j d = 1) (3.16)
Under random treatment selection, we have  = E[y(1)   y(0)jd = 1], which is
identied. Hence, the dummy-endogenous variable model identies the distribution
of program impacts.83
3.4.2 Fr echet Space
Because of the evaluation problem, one cannot observe an individual's outcome
in both treatment and control states. Therefore, it is not possible to identify the
distribution of program impacts without imposing more structure on the problem
at hand. However, we may be able to partially identify some features of the distri-
bution of the random vector (y(0);y(1)) when P(y(1)) and P(y(0)) are identied.5
Let us introduce the following notation. H denotes the bi-dimensional cu-
mulative distribution function of the random vector (y(0);y(1)), where H(t) =
P(y0  t1;y1  t2), with t = (t1;t2) 2 R2. H denotes the Fr echet Space
given the marginals, that is H(F0;F1) is the space of all cumulative distribu-
tion functions H(t) on R2 with xed marginal cumulative distribution functions
F0(t1) = P(y0  t1) and F1(t2) = P(y1  t2). We denote by EH the expectation
operator under the joint distribution H.
Frechett (1951) showed that the distribution H(x1;x2) belongs to H(F0;F1) if
and only if
H (t1;t2)  H(t1;t2)  H+(t1;t2) (3.17)
for all (t1;t2) 2 R2 , where
H (t1;t2) = maxfF1(t2) + F0(t1)   1;0g (3.18)
H+(t1;t2) = minfF0(t1);F1(t2)g (3.19)
More recently, Ruschendorf (1981) showed that these bounds are sharp.
Tchen (1980) has established a result that will be proved to be very useful
for the purposes of the present analysis. This result states that nonnegative and
convex functions are monotone on the Fr echet Space:
5For a review of the partial identication approach see Manski (2003).84
Lemma 3.1 (Tchen 1980) For any convex nonnegative function   dened on R,
EH (y1   y0) 2

EH+ (y1   y0);EH  (y1   y0)

for all H 2 H(F1;F2).
3.4.3 Partial Identication of Mobility Treatment Eects
Because of the evaluation problem, many distributional scenarios are consistent
with the data at hand. Could it be possible to "measure" this multiplicity of
scenarios through some statistic? In this section we provide a way to do it by
applying the same kind of logic we can nd in studies of economic mobility.
While the goal of analyzing treatment eects is to predict the outcomes that
would occur if dierent treatment rules were applied to the population (Manski
2003), the study of economic mobility centers on quantifying the movement of the
units of analysis through the distribution of economic well-being over time. More
precisely, research on economic mobility tries to connect past and present, "estab-
lishing how dependent one's current economic position is on one's past position..."
(Fields 2001). In this sense, the analysis of economic mobility does not have to
face the evaluation problem since both states, past and present, are observed in
principle.
Suppose for a moment that we were able to identify counterfactual outcomes
for two individuals. One of the individuals experiences a program impact of +100,
the other individual experiences a decrease in the outcome of interest of -100.
Keeping everything else constant, how much outcome movement has taken place?
The standard approach to answer this question is to estimate the average treat-
ment eect, so the net eect of the treatment is zero. After this simple exercise,85
one is left with the feeling that overall the treatment eect has been totally neu-
tral. However, the fact that the two individuals considered in this simple example
registered changes in their outcomes implies that the treatment is not neutral at
all.
Fields and Ok (1996) dene a measure of mobility that considers symmetric
income movements6 as
R
j w   z j dH(w;z), where wi and zi are the incomes
of individual i at two dierent points on time. We can extend this measure to
the context of program evaluation by redening these variables, so our measure of
mobility treatment eects would be given by
m =
Z
j y1   y0 j dH(y1;y0) (3.20)
In contrast to mobility analysis, when analyzing treatment eects one has no in-
formation on counterfactual outcomes for the treated population, so we cannot
identify this measure. However, we can partially identify m since the absolute
value function is convex and positive (Lemma 3.1).
One complication arises since most data sets, and the Progresa data set is not
the exception, have unbalanced sample sizes, that is to say, the number of obser-
vations in the treatment group is not the same than the number of observations in
the control group. We circumvent this problem by using quantiles of the empirical
distributions ^ F0 and ^ F1
7. Table presents some estimations of m based on 100, 500,
and 900 quantiles. The bootstrap condence intervals were estimated using 2000
bootstrap replications. The ratio mH+=mH  is around six to one, which indicates
that a great number of distributional scenarios are compatible with the data at
6Symmetric outcome movement arises when individuals' outcomes change from
one state to another and one is concerned about the magnitude of these uctuations
but not their direction.
7The applied algorithm is described in more detail in Appendix B.86
hand. Because of the evaluation problem, one cannot discard the possibility of
Table 3.2: Mobility Treatment Eects
Number of Quantiles [mH+;mH ] 95% Normal CI 90% Percentile CI
100 [25.719, 147.524] [21.167,151.148] [22.280, 152.076]
500 [26.461, 156.838] [22.156,161.246] [23.030, 160.954]
900 [26.004, 158.575] [21.609,163.339] [23.178, 162.985]
having an important subset of the treated population receiving negative treatment
eects when ATE are strictly positive. Let L = fj 2 J : yj(1) < yj(0)g denote
the set of members of population J that register a loss as a result of participating
in the program. Although it is not possible to identify the set of individuals who
belong to this set in general, we can partially identify a parameter that may shed
some light on the potential negative eects of being exposed to the treatment, at
least in average sense.8 We dene the average loss of participating in the program
as follows9
LH =
Z
1L(y(1)   y(0))dH (3.21)
=
Z
min(y(1)   y(0);0)dH (3.22)
Lemma 3.2 Sharp bounds on L are given by [LH ;LH+].
PROOF: See Appendix.
Table 3 presents some estimations of L based on 100, 500, and 900 quantiles
(the bootstrap condence intervals were also estimated using 2000 bootstrap repli-
cations). Even though these worst case bounds may seem exaggerated at a rst
8Notice that these are worst case bounds. Monotonicity assumption motivated
my program design and economic theory can be proved to be very helpful to
improve inference.
91L is the indicator function which is equal to one if j 2 L, and 0 otherwise.87
Table 3.3: Average Loss
Number of Quantiles [LH ;LH+] 95% Normal CI 90% Percentile CI
100 [-61.589,0.000] [-64.752,0.000] [-64.326,0.000]
500 [-66.062, -.724] [-69.784,0.000] [-69.083,-.004]
900 [-66.607, -.317] [-70.356,0.000] [-69.947,-.020]
sight, especially the lower bound, they are a reminder that ATE may be missing
a lot of relevant information. This empirically corroborates the fact that the eval-
uation problem generally implies the existence of multiple distributional scenarios
consistent with the data generating process.
3.5 Testing for Homogeneity in Program Impacts
In this section, we apply a partial identication approach that will allow us to
develop simple tests to evaluate the hypothesis of homogeneous treatment eects
on the treated.
Consider testing
H0 : y(1)   y(0) = c a.s.
versus
H1 : y(1)   y(0) 6= c a.s.
For some real number c = E(y1)   E(y0).
Dene the functional
(F0;F1) =
Z
 (y(1)   y(0))dH+    (
Z
y(1)dF1  
Z
y(0)dF0) (3.23)
where  () : R ! R+ belongs to the class of nonnegative and strictly convex real
valued functions. The following result will be proved to be very helpful for testing
the hypothesis of homogeneous program impacts:88
Proposition 3.3 Let  () : R ! R+ be any nonnegative and strictly convex real
valued function. If (F0;F1) > 0, then y(1)   y(0) 6= c a.s.
PROOF: See Appendix.
Therefore, we could test the hypothesis of homogeneity in program impacts
through testing the hypothesis H0 : (F0;F1) = 0. As an example, let W denote
the family of functionals dened by

(F0;F1) :  =
R
(jy(1)   y(0)jdH+   j
R
y(1)dF1  
R
y(0)dF0j;  2
	
It can be shown that  (x) =j x j is a strictly convex function10 for   2 (See
Appendix). Therefore, (F0;F1) > 0 implies y(1)   y(0) 6= c a.s.
From here, we can derive an indirect way of testing the null hypothesis by
statistically comparing the hypothesis
H0 : (F0;F1) = 0
versus
H1 : (F0;F1) 6= 0
Corollary 3.1 The hypothesis of homogeneous treatment eects can be rejected if
V ar(Y (1)) 6= V ar(Y (0))
PROOF: See Appendix.
Corollary 3.1 can be proved to be very helpful if we impose more structure
on the problem. Let Yi(1)  N(1;2
1) and Yj(0)  N(0;2
0), i = 1;:::;n,
j = 1;:::;m, be two independent random samples. Notice that
10Notice that V arH+(Y (0)   Y (1)) is a member of W since V arH+(Y (0)  
Y (1)) = 2.89
S2
1=2
1
S2
0=2
0  Fn 1;m 1
where S2
i , i = 0;1, is the sample variance, and Fn 1;m 1 is the F distribution with
n   1 and m   1 degrees of freedom. Therefore, if the populations are normally
distributed, we can test H0 by statistically testing the hypothesis
1
0 = 1.
Table 3.4: F test for H0 :
1
0 = 1
S2
0 S2
1 f =
S2
1
S2
0 n m P(Fn 1;m 1 < f)
18791.13 27779.93 1.478 6946 4098 1
From table 3.4, it is clear that we can reject the hypothesis that both popu-
lations share the same standard deviation. Consequently, the hypothesis of ho-
mogeneity in program impacts is also rejected. However, this test is not accurate
unless the distributions of the populations are close to normal.11
We also apply other tests for equality of variances that are less sensitive to
departures from normality. Levene's test (1960) tends to be more robust than the
F test when the distribution is not Gaussian. Brown and Forsythe (1974) extended
Levene's test to use either the median or the trimmed mean instead of the mean.
Let W0, W:50, and W:10 denote, respectively, the original Levene's statistic, the
Levene's statistic replacing the mean by the median, and the Levene's statistic
with a 10% trimmed mean.12 All of these tests reject the null hypothesis at the
1% level (see table 3.5).13
11A skewness and kurtosis test rejects the hypothesis of normality. In fact, the
hypothesis of symmetry can also be easily rejected.
12Brown and Forsythe(1974) reached the conclusion that using the trimmed
mean performed best when the underlying data followed a Cauchy distribution (i.e.,
heavy-tailed) and the median performed best when the underlying data followed a
(i.e., skewed) distribution. Using the mean provided the best power for symmetric,
moderate-tailed, distributions
13The Levene's test rejects the null hypothesis if W > F1;n+m 2 where F1;n+m 290
Table 3.5: Levene's statistics
W0 W:10 W:50
9.003 7.796 8.019
Another alternative is to use bootstrap methods to estimate the distribution of
the statistic ^  by resampling the evaluation samples (Efron 1979). Let P(^     j
F0;F1) denote the exact, nite sample distribution of ^    . Using standard
notation from the bootstrap literature, let ^    ^  be computed from observations
obtained according to the empirical distributions ^ F0 and ^ F1 in the same way ^  
is computed from the true observations Yi(1)  F1 and Yj(0)  F0, i = 1;:::;n,
j = 1;:::;m. Finally, let Q
 denote the -quantile of the CDF of ^    ^ . That is
Q

 = inff^ 
 : P(^ 
   ^  j ^ F0; ^ F1)  g (3.24)
A commonly applied method to test H0 is to assume that ^     is normally
distributed, and then to use the bootstrap estimate of the standard deviation as
an approximate estimator of the true sample variance. That is
^    
^   N(0;1) (3.25)
However, under the null,  is at the boundary of the parameter space since   0.
This implies that the random quantity ^ =^  is always positive, and hence it cannot
be normally distributed with mean zero and variance one.
One possible solution for this problem is to follow Efron (1987) by assuming
the existence of a monotone increasing transformation '() : R ! R such that
'(^ )   '()  N(z;
2
) (3.26)
is the upper critical value of the F distribution for some predetermined signicance
level.91
for every choice of  (z is know as the bias correction term). For the purpose of
the present study, we can weaken this assumption by requiring just symmetry for
the distribution of '(^ )   '().
Proposition 3.4 Suppose there exists a strictly increasing function '() : R ! R
such that
'(^ )   '() j F0;F1  V
'(^ )   '(^ ) j ^ F0; ^ F1  V
where V is continuously and symmetrically distributed about  2 R, satisfying
FV(2 + F  1()) > 0
for some  2 (0;1=2). Then
Reject H0 if min ^  > 0
is a level  test.
PROOF: See Appendix.
We estimate the bootstrap cdf of ^ 
2 using B = 2000 bootstrap replications.
From table 3.6, it can be inferred that the null hypothesis of homogeneous treat-
ment eects can be easily rejected under the assumptions of the proposition. For
instance, if V  N( ;2), we have
P('(^ 	
)   '(^ 	)) = P(Z    < 0)
= P(Z < )
= FZ()92
A plug in estimator for  is therefore given by
^  = F
 1
Z
 
#f'(^ ) < '(^ )g
B
!
= F
 1
Z
 
#f^  < ^ g
B
!
where the last equality follows from the monotonicity of '(). As expected, the sign
of this parameter is strictly negative, taking values in the range (F
 1
Z (:25);F
 1
Z (:50))
for #q 2 f100;300;600;800;1000g, where #q indicates the number of quantiles
used in the estimation. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1%
level under the assumption of normality.
Andrews (2000) argues that the bootstrap may not be consistent when the pa-
rameter of interest is on a boundary of the parameter space. One possible solution
is to draw subsamples of size k < min(n;m) from the original data with replace-
ment. This sampling method is identical to the standard bootstrap in every aspect,
but the size of each replication.14 Another possible advantage of this method is that
we can estimate the bootstrap distribution of ^  without using the quantiles of the
empirical distributions as the original data. Table 3.7 presents several quantiles
of the bootstrap distribution of ^ 
2 for k 2 f1000;2000;3000;3500;4000g. Under
the assumption of normality and bias correction, the hypothesis of homogeneity in
program impacts can be rejected at the 1% level.
14Bickel et al (1997) discuss a number of resampling schemes under which the
size of the sample replication is smaller than the original sample size. They argue
than the k out of n sampling scheme works very well in all known realistic examples
of bootstrap failure.93
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3.6 Identication of Program Impacts under Monotonicity
Assumptions
The bounds implied by the Fr echet Space of bivariate distributions proved to
be very helpful for developing a test for homogeneity of program impacts. How-
ever, without further assumptions, it is an impossible task to pin down the actual
distribution of treatment eects even in the case of a random experiment.
Inference on the distribution of program impacts may be improved by impos-
ing assumptions implied by economic theory or any other mechanism related with
the data generating process such as program design. Manski (1997) investigates
what may be learned about treatment response under the assumptions of mono-
tone, semi-monotone, and concave-monotone response functions. He shows that
these assumptions have identifying power, particularly when compared to a situa-
tion where no prior information exists (worst case bounds). Typically, the type of
monotonicity assumptions applied by econometricians dealing with partially identi-
ed parameters take some form of stochastic dominance. For instance, in a missing
treatments environment, Molinari (2005b) shows that one can extract information
from the observations for which treatment data are missing using monotonicity
assumptions. Specically, one could assume that the eect of a social program on
the outcome of interest cannot be negative. This is equivalent to assume that for
each j in J we have
j = maxfyj(1)   yj(0);0g (3.27)
Given the design of Progresa, this seems to be a reasonable assumption. One can
expect a positive eect on the outcome of interest, in our case consumption, for
treated individuals. Moreover, this type of assumption implies rst order stochastic96
dominance (FSD) of distribution P(y(1)) over distribution P(y(0)): i.e. P(y1 
x)  P(y0  x) for all x 2 R. Actually, this assumption is stronger than FSD. It
implies that, for all t 2 R, we have
P(y(1)  t j y(0) = t) = 1 (3.28)
Notice that the converse is not always true, that is to say, stochastic dominance
does not necessarily imply monotonicity.15
From section 3.3, we know that if human capital is a normal good, a policy-
maker implementing a CCTS faces a dilemma: on the one hand, it may represent
a very helpful policy tool for achieving an ecient level of human capital. On the
other hand, this policy instrument may be at odds with a more equal distribution of
eective benets. In particular, it was argued that when the conditioned-on good
is normal, better-o households tend to receive larger "eective" benets, once the
opportunity cost of foregone earnings from child labor is deducted. Unfortunately,
because of the evaluation problem, we cannot test this hypothesis without impos-
ing more assumptions. We circumvent this problem by establishing a dierent
type of monotonicity assumption, one that will allow us to test the hypothesis of
regressivity in program impacts.
We assume the existence of a non-decreasing real valued function () : R ! R
such that
yj(1) = (yj(0)) (3.29)
Notice that function () is not indexed, and in consequence this assumption im-
plies rank preservation among the members of population J. More precisely, in the
15To see that, just observe the random vector (y(0);y(1)) whose support consists
of two points: (1,3) and (2,1). Clearly y(1) stochastically dominates y(0), but the
monotonicity assumption is violated.97
contest of program evaluation, rank preservation means that, for some outcome of
interest Y , the rank of a particular unit of observation i with respect to any other
observation j is the same in both treatment and control states. More formally,
rank preservation implies that, for any two members i and j of population J, the
following relation holds:
(yi(0);yi(1))  (yj(0);yj(1))
This untestable assumption is also a necessary condition for the existence of re-
gressive program impacts16.
Let (y(0)) = (y(0))   y(0). We say that there is regressivity in program
impacts whenever (y(0)) is a non-decreasing and non-trivial function of y(0),
that is, for any i;j 2 J, such that yi(0) > yj(0), we have17
(yi(0))   (yj(0))
yi(0)   yj(0)
 1 (3.30)
In order to make this result operational, and to test the hypothesis of regressiv-
ity in program impacts, we will use quantile treatment eects18(QTE), which are
a natural extension of rank preservation to the analysis of distribution of treat-
ment eects. Let us introduce this concept more formally. The qth quantile of
distribution Fi(y), i = 0;1 is dened as:
yi(q) = inffy : Fi(y)  qg
16Let (yi(0);yi(1)) and (yi(0);yi(1)) be the outcomes in both states for i;j 2 J.
Without loss of generality, let yi(0) > yj(0). Regressivity in program impacts is
equivalent to yi(1)   yi(0) > yi(1)   yi(0), which implies yi(1) > yj(1)
17More precisely, there is regressivity in program impacts if (y(0)) is a non-
decreasing and non-trivial function almost everywhere.
18See Koenker and Bassett (1978) for an application of quantile estimation to
a regression setting. Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) extend their idea to the
estimation of quantile treatment eects. See Appendix C for a description of the
QTE estimator.98
The following result will be proved to be useful for the empirical application. It
shows the existence of the function () under some mild continuity assumption:
Lemma 3.3 If y0(q) is a continuity point of F0, then there exists a non-decreasing
function (q) : (0;1) ! R such that y1(q) = (y0(q)); moreover, there exists a
unique function (q) satisfying (q) = y1(q)   y0(q).
PROOF: See Appendix.
The QTE for quantile q can be dened as the dierence in treatment status
between quantile q of treatment group and quantile q of control group. Formally,
QTE for quantile q is given by
(q) = y1(q)   y0(q)
Therefore, QTE represent an alternative way for testing for regressivity in pro-
gram impacts. A non decreasing and non-trivial QTE function is strong evidence
for regressive program impacts under the assumption of rank preservation, where
for rank preservation we mean rank preservation in terms of quantiles of the dis-
tributions F1 and F0.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 introduce the QTE estimator for per capita total expen-
ditures and per capita food purchase, respectively, for several quantiles. These
quantiles were estimated simultaneously, so statistical comparisons can be made
among them. Empirical variance of QTE was calculated by means of 200 bootstrap
replications of the quantile treatment eect.
We plot these QTE in gures 3.1 and 3.2. For comparison purposes, we plot
the average treatment eect as a horizontal dashed line. Dotted lines surrounding
the ATE line represent a 95% condence interval. Clearly, the variation of the
treatment eects across the dierent quantiles is both economically and statisti-99
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cally signicant, particularly at the extremes of the QTE plot, although for a broad
band treatment eects are statistically homogeneous.
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Figure 3.1: Quantile Treatment Eects: Total Expenditure
The QTE estimators are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical
model: better o households tend to receive larger positive impacts from the
program which generates the monotonically increasing shape of the QTE. This
characteristic of the QTE for PROGRESA is more remarkable when one contrast
que treatment eect between the lower 20 and the upper 20 centiles. For instance,
in the case of total expenditure, the treatment eect for the 95th centile is about
ve times the treatment eect estimated for the 5th centile. This gap is about 10
times between the same quantiles in the case of food purchase.
QTE estimation also represents an alternative method to test for homogene-
ity in program impacts under some mild regularity conditions. This assertion is
formalized in the following Lemma:102
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Figure 3.2: Quantile Treatment Eects: Food Purchase
Lemma 3.4 If treatment eects are homogeneous across the population, then (q) =
 for all q 2 [0;1] such that y0(q) is a continuity point of F0.
PROOF: See Appendix.
From tables 3.7 and 3.8, we can conclude that the hypothesis of homogeneity
in program impacts can be rejected under the conditions of Lemma 3.4.
3.7 Conclusions
Conditional cash transfers represent an important policy tool for ghting poverty,
particularly when there is some type of externality that prevents the poor from
reaching more ecient equilibria. Human capital investment is just one example
of an activity generating positive externalities. Correcting for these externalities
is then an important step to break the circle of intergenerational poverty.
There are some issues, however, that should be considered by policymakers103
implementing this type of programs. If the conditioned-on good is normal, then it
is very likely that the distributional eects of the program will be far from being
distributionally neutral. In fact, as we saw in the empirical analysis, heterogeneous
treatment eects are pervasive, at least in the case of the Progresa evaluation
sample.
Under the assumption of rank preservation, program impacts tend to be distri-
butionally regressive for the population participating in Progresa. As it was argued
in the text, this nding is also consistent with the fact that the conditioned-on good
is normal. Therefore, if the assumption of rank preservation is correct, the poorest
of the poor may not be receiving as much benets as policymakers believe they
are. This has important implications for the design of antipoverty policies: pol-
icymakers should consider the existent tradeo between equity and eciency of
outcomes in order to better understand the consequences and limitations of CCTS
like Progresa. The nal answer will much depend on the benets and costs of
improving the targeting eciency of a program.104
3.8 Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The household bargaining model is solved through
the program
L = (x

1fx

2f((1   l) + b)
1 )
(x

1mx

2m(h(1   l) + b)
1 )
1  +
1(a + l   s   x1f   x1m) +
2(a + s + (1   )(1   l)   b   x2f   x2m) +
3s + 4b
from where we can obtain the following rst order conditions:
z1
x1f
= 1
z1
x2f
= 2
z3
x1m
= 1
z4
x2m
= 2
 z20(1   l)
(1   l) + b
+ 1   2(1   )
0(1   l) = 0
z2
(1   l) + b
  2 + 4 = 0
 1 + 2 + 3 = 0
where z1 = , z2 = (1   ) + (1   )(1   ), and z3 = (1   ). From the rst
order conditions we have
x1m =
z3
z1
x1f
x2m =
z3
z1
x2f
z20(h)
(h) + b
=
z1
x1f
and

0(h)  1105
with the last condition holding with equality if (b;s) 2 R2
++.
For the second part, assume the household is both savings and bequest con-
strained, so b = s = 0. Assume also that it receives an exogenous transfer of
income ! > 0 in period 1. From the rst order conditions
0(1   l)
(1   l)
=
z1
z2x1f
=
z3
z2x1m
Since the household is both bequest an savings constrained, we have l < lo and
x1f + x1m = a + ! + l. Assume, towards a contradiction, that child labor does
not decrease: i.e. l  0. Hence, either x1f or x1m increases. This fact and
the condition above together imply an increase in child labor, a contradiction.
Therefore, human capital is a normal good. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: The proof for the rst part of the proposition is
along the lines of the case with one-sided altruism. To prove that human capital
is a normal good, assume the household receives an exogenous positive transfer in
period 1, say ! > 0. If the household is both saving and bequest constrained,
then the budget constraint in period 1 is given by x1m+x1f = a+!+l. Assume,
towards a contradiction, that child labor increases. From the rst order conditions,
both x1m and x1m increase in equilibrium. From the rst order conditions, we also
have:
z3
x1f
=
2
4z2 +
h
z4

z4+z1
z1
i
(1   )
a + (1   )
3
5 0(1   l)
(1   l)
This is clearly a contradiction since the left-hand side of the equation strictly
decreases, while the right-hand side increases or remains constant.
Lemma 3.5 Sharp bounds on the correlation coecient Y0;Y1 are given by
[
Y0;Y1
H+ ;
Y0;Y1
H  ]106
PROOF:
Y0;Y1 =
V ar(Y1   Y0)   V ar(Y1)   V ar(Y0)
2
p
V ar(Y0)V ar(Y1)
=
E(Y1   Y0)2   (E(Y1)   E(Y0))2   V ar(Y1)   V ar(Y0)
2
p
V ar(Y0)V ar(Y1)
Since '(x) = x2 is a convex function, the result follows from Lemma 3.1. Sharpness
follows from the fact that H  and H+ are sharp bounds on the Fr echet Space.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 : Notice that the absolute value of the program impact
can be decomposed as follows
j y(1)   y(0) j= y(1)   y(0)   2min(y(1)   y(0);0)
Taking expectations at both sides of the equality, we have
m = E(y(1)   y(0))   2L
From where
L =
E(y(1)   y(0))   m
2
(3.31)
Since m is positive, the result follows from Lemma 3.1. Alternatively, we can apply
Lemma 3.1 directly by noticing that
min(y(1)   y(0);0) =  max(y(0)   y(1);0)
and '(x) = max(x;0) is a convex function.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: By Lemma 3.1 and the Frechet bounds, we have
Z
 (y1   y0)dH    (
Z
y1dF1  
Z
y0dF0)  (F0;F1)
for all H 2 H(F1;F0). Dene a random variable Z = Y1   Y0. By Jensen's107
inequality
Z
 (z)dH+   (
Z
zdH+)
=  (
Z
y1dH+  
Z
y0dH+)
=  (
Z
y1dF1  
Z
y0dF0)
which is equivalent to (F0;F1)  0. The result follows by using the fact that
Jensen's inequality holds with equality for the case of strictly convex functions if
and only if Y1   Y0 is a constant with probability 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Notice that
2 = V arH+(Y (1)   Y (0))
= 
2
1 + 
2
0   2H+10
 
2
1 + 
2
0   210
= (1   0)
2
where H+ is the correlation coecient evaluated at H+. Hence 1 6= 0 implies
2 > 0, and the result follows from Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Corollary 3.1 when y(1) and y(0) are members of the same
location-scale family. Since y0 and y1 are members of the same location-scale
family, we have
yi = iZ + i
for i = 0;1, where Z  f(z). Because for any location-scale family it is possible to
choose f(z) such that EZ = 0 and EZ2=1, without loss of generality, we choose
these values for the rst and second moment of Z. Notice that the extreme joint
distribution H+ is obtained when there is maximum correlation between y1 and108
y0. This occurs when high values of y1 are "matched" with high values of y0. This
is equivalent to form the pairs (0z + 0;1z + 1) for all z in the support of Z.
Hence
Z
(y(1)   y(0))
2dH+ =
Z
[(1   0)z + (1   0)]
2df(z)
= EZ[((1   0)
2Z
2 + 2(1   0)(1   0)Z + (1   0)
2]
= (1   0)
2 + (1   0)
2
The result follows from Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Notice that to test the hypothesis H0 :  = 0 is
equivalent to test H
'
0 : '() = '(0). A level  2 (0;1=2) for the latter hypothesis
is given by
Reject H
'
0 : '() = '(0) if V1     < ^ '   '(0)
where V = F  1(). This a straightforward result since under the null we have
P(V1     < ^ '   '(0)) = 
I will refer to this test as T1 for the rest of the proof. Let G(s) = P(' < s) be
the bootstrap cdf of '. Since ' = ^ '    + V , we have
G(s) = P(V < s   ^ ' + )
= FV(s   ^ ' + )
with inverse G 1() = F
 1
V () + ^ '   . I claim that the test T2 dened as
Reject H
'
0 if '(0) < G 1(FV(2 + V))
is equivalent to T1. This is true since
G
 1(FV(2 + V)) = 2 + V + ^ '   
=    V1  + '109
It follows that the test T3
Reject H
'
0 if '(0) < min'(^ )
is a level  test since, for some  2 (0;1=2)
'(0) < min'(^ 
)
 G
 1(FV(2 + V))
Finally, let H(s) = P(^ 	 < s) be the bootstrap cdf of ^ 	. Since '() is a
strictly increasing transformation, the quantiles of '(^ 	) coincide with those of
^ 	. Hence, T3 is equivalent to
Reject H0 : 	 = 0 if 0 < min ^ 	
since min'(^ 	) = '(min ^ 	). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.6  (x) =j x j is a strictly convex function for   2
PROOF: For  = 2, the result is immediate since  (x) = x2, and  00 > 0. For
 > 2, we make use of Pecaric and Dragomir's inequality, which indicates that if
pq(q + p) > 0, z1;z2 2 R, and   1, then
j z1 + z2 j
p + q

j z1 j
p
+
j z2 j
q
w.l.g. dene z1 = x, z2 = (1   )y, x;y 2 R, p = , q = 1   , and  2 (0;1).
Then we have (1   ) > 0, and hence
j x + (1   )y j
 
j x j

+
j (1   )y j
1   
= 
 1 j x j
 +(1   )
 1 j y j

<  j x j
 +(1   ) j y j

Where I have used the fact that  1 <  and (1   ) 1 < (1   ), for  > 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let (y0(q)) and () be dened, respectively, by110
(y0(q)) = inff : q  F1(y0(q) + )g
and
(y0(q)) = F
 1
1 (F0(y0(q)))
From the quantile function, we have
y1(q) = F
 1
1 (q) = inffx : F(y(1)  x) > qg
Hence,
y1(q) = (y0(q)) = F
 1
1 (q) = (y0(q)) + y0(q)
The result follows by noticing that (y0(q)) is a non-decreasing function of y0(q).
For a proof of uniqueness see Doksum (1974).
Proof of Lemma 3.4: Doksum (1974) shows that if (x)) =  for x in the
support of y(0), then F0(x) = F1(x + ) for all x. Therefore
F0(y0(q)) = F1(y0(q) + )
From the proof of Lemma 3.3, we have
y1(q) = F
 1
1 (F0(y0(q))) = y0(q) + 
The result follows.111
3.9 Appendix B: Estimation and Bootstrap Algorithm us-
ing the Empirical Quantiles
The objective is to estimate bootstrap condence intervals for the parameters
  = EH [(y1   y0)] and + = EH+[(y1   y0)], for some measurable function
(). The data in this problem consists of two independent random samples drawn
Yi(1)  F1 and Yj(0)  F0, i = 1;:::;n, j = 1;:::;m. Let ^ F1 and ^ F0 denote the
empirical distribution functions implied by these samples.
1. Estimation of   and +
1) Estimate b = [ minfn;mg] empirical quantiles for F1 and F0, where  2
(0;1) and [] is the integer function. More precisely, for each t 2 ft1;:::;tbg,
i = 1;2, we estimate
q
tj
i = inffx : ^ Fi(y(i)  x)  tjg (3.32)
2) Let ^ Q1 and ^ Q0 be the empirical distribution function of the quantiles esti-
mated above, that is to say, a distribution placing a probability mass 1
b to each of
these quantiles:
^ Qi(x) =
1
b
b X
j=1
1(q
tj
i  x) (3.33)
3) For all x = (x1;x2) 2 R2, dene
^ H (x1;x2) = maxf ^ Q0(x1) + ^ Q1(x2)   1;0g (3.34)
^ H+(x1;x2) = minf ^ Q0(x1); ^ Q1(x2)g (3.35)
4) Estimate  using plug-in estimators: ^   = ( ^ H ) and ^ + = ( ^ H+).
2. Estimation of the Extreme distributions H  and H+112
Dene the sequences of quantiles of F1 and F0, respectively, by fq
tj
1 g and fq
tj
0 g.
Let i = EQi[qt
i] denote the expected value of the chosen quantiles under proba-
bility measure Qi. The correlation coecient between qt
1 and qt
0 is given by
(q
t
0;q
t
1) =
1
b
X
(q
tj
1   1)(q
tj
0   0) (3.36)
By Lemma 3.5, we know that this coecient is at its minimum when it is evaluated
at H+, and is at its maximum when evaluated at H . We can estimate the extreme
distributions H  and H+ by applying the following result:
Lemma 3.7 (Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya 1952) The sum of products
P
i xiyi
is a maximum when both fxig and fyig are increasing, and a minimum when one
is increasing and the other is decreasing.
Therefore. by dening xj = (q
tj
1   1) and yj = (q
tj
1   0), it follows that H+ is
obtained by pairing the largest quantile of F1 with the largest quantile of F0, the
second largest quantile of F1 with the second largest quantile of F0, and so on.
To construct H , we just need to pair the largest quantile of F1 with the smallest
quantile of F0, the second largest quantile of F1, with the second smallest quantile
of F0, and so on.
3. Bootstrap
5) Generate bootstrap random samples from ^ F1 and ^ F0: Y 
i (1)  F1 and
Y 
j (0)  F0, i = 1;:::;n, j = 1;:::;m.
Let F 
1 and F 
0 denote the empirical distributions implied by the bootstrap
random samples. That is
F

i (x) =
1
b
X
j
1(yij  x) (3.37)
6) Replicate steps 1)-4) above for the bootstrap distributions F 
1 and F 
0. That
is:113
6a) Estimate b empirical quantiles for F 
1 and F 
0
q
tj
i = inffx : F

i (y
(i)  x)  tjg (3.38)
6b) Let Q
1 and Q
0 be the empirical distribution of the quantiles estimated
above, that is to say, a distribution placing a probability mass 1
b to each of these
quantiles.
Q

i(x) =
1
b
b X
j=1
1(q
tj
i  x) (3.39)
6c) Dene
H

 (x1;x2) = maxfQ

0(x1) + Q

1(x2)   1;0g (3.40)
H

+(x1;x2) = minfQ

0(x1);Q

1(x2)g (3.41)
6d) Estimate 
  and 
+, respectively, by 
  = (H
 ) and 
+ = ( ^ H
+).
7) Repeated independent generation of F 
1 and F 
0 yields a sequence of inde-
pendent realizations of 
+ and 
 , which can be used to approximate their actual
bootstrap distribution.114
3.10 Appendix C: Quantile Treatment Eects
Let Qq(Y j T) be the conditional quantile function of the conditional distribu-
tion F(Y j T), where T 2 f0;1g is the binary variable indicating treatment status:
it takes the value of 1 if treated, and 0 otherwise. Assume F(Y j T) is continuous
and strictly increasing, and that Qq(Y j T) is linear:
Qq(Y j T) = q + qT
It can be shown that the parameters q and q can be characterized as fol-
lows (Koenker 1978)
(q;q) = argmin(;)2R2 E[q(Y      T)]
where q(u) = u(q I(u < 0)) is the check function. Let  and  be the solution
to this problem. Then it is easy to show that the QTE can be recovered from here
since
(q) = y1(q)   y0(q) = Qq(Y j T = 1)   Qq(Y j T = 0) = 

q
For the estimation, let (yi;Ti)n
i=1 be a sample from the population. Then we can
apply the analog principle and follow Koenker and Bassett (1978) to estimate 
and :
(^ q; ^ q) = argmin(;)2R2 n 1 Pn
i=1 q(Yi      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